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I. INTRODUCTION 
How might we think about reforming abortion regulation in a world 
in which the basic legality of abortion may, as a matter of constitutional 
law, at last be relatively secure? I have in mind the era just upon us in 
which the overturn of Roe v. Wade1 no longer looms so threateningly over 
the reproductive rights community in the United States and is no longer 
necessarily its central concern. There is now a general and seemingly well-
founded optimism that under the Obama administration, those who support 
and rely on reproductive rights will not have to pray nightly for the health 
of Supreme Court justices (although we wish them well). As Senator 
Obama said in 2008 on the 35th anniversary of Roe: 
With one more vacancy on the Supreme Court, we could be 
looking at a majority hostile to a woman’s fundamental right to 
choose for the first time since Roe v. Wade. The next president 
may be asked to nominate that Supreme Court justice. That is 
what is at stake in this election.2 
It appears that since January 20, 2009, Justice Stevens may, if he 
wishes, hang out rather than hang on, and the rest of us may now be more 
confident that vacancies on the court are less likely to put the basic right to 
abortion in jeopardy. President Obama’s first Supreme Court appointment, 
Sonia Sotomayor, characterized the Court’s decision in Planned 
                                            
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2 Press Release, Barack Obama, Statement on 35th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade 
Decision (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.barackobama.com/2008/01/22/obama_statement 
_on_35th_ annive.php. 
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Parenthood vs. Casey as “settled” and “the precedent of the court” during 
her confirmation hearings.3 While confidence in a justice’s future decisions 
is never assured, it seems, for the moment anyway, that Roe will not be 
overturned. 4 
Despite the relief that flows from this greater sense of reproductive 
security, much legal work still needs to be done to secure healthier 
reproductive lives for women. Some of that work will remain 
constitutionally focused. Without the prospect of overturning Roe in the 
immediate future, pro-life legislators may focus ever more vigorously on 
whittling down women’s access to abortion through the targeted hyper-
regulation of abortion provision, access, and consent.5 Ever since the stingy 
affirmance of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 the Supreme Court has 
affirmed the constitutionality of almost every regulatory requirement 
imposed by states on abortion patients, clinics, and doctors.7 Constant 
vigilance over Roe may no longer be required, but lawyers still have plenty 
to do defending its current boundaries. 
Yet constitutional advocacy is only part of the project for a pro-
choice post-Roe agenda.8 This Article considers the possibilities for 
statutory abortion reform and seeks to extend the audience to include 
                                            
3 Charlie Savage, Respecting Precedent, or Settled Law, Unless It’s Not Settled, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/us/politics/ 
15abortion.html. 
4 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, On Sotomayor, Some Abortion Rights Backers Are 
Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/ 
politics/28abortion.html. 
5 See generally Center for Reproductive Rights, Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers (TRAP): Avoiding the TRAP (Nov. 1, 2007), 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/document/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap-
avoiding-the-trap.  
6 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). 
7 As a Fourth Circuit judge observed in a South Carolina case, these burdensome 
regulations—“micromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop varnish to the 
location of janitors’ closets”—have in a number of states “made abortions effectively 
unavailable, if not technically illegal.” Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Envtl. Control, 317 F.3d 357, 371–72 (4th Cir. 2002) (King, J., dissenting) 
(upholding an elaborate set of state abortion regulations). 
8 See Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing 
Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1409–12 (2009) (arguing that the “court-generated 
rights discourse” has legitimated a minimalist state response to the problems of pregnant 
women). 
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legislatures in addition to courts. Are there arguments that have been 
obscured or overlooked in recent years but that, when brought more clearly 
to light, might appeal to those who enact statutes or to the citizens who vote 
for them? The possibilities for reform seem especially exciting right now. 
Not only has Roe’s reversal become less likely, but a number of Bush-era 
anti-abortion policies have already been countermanded by President 
Obama. These include the ban on aid to family planning programs abroad, 9 
prohibitions on stem cell research,10 and a last-minute conscientious 
objection opt-out for health care providers.11 Once the subject of abortion is 
freed from the pervasive demonization expressed in the policies and politics 
of the last several years, we might be able to consider its regulation more 
reflectively. 
Indeed, there have been recent signs that electorates, when more 
directly involved in reproductive issues, do not in every instance vote to 
make abortion less accessible. In November 2008, the voters of South 
Dakota rejected Measure 11, a comprehensive abortion ban;12 Colorado 
voters rejected the Definition of Person Initiative, which would have 
defined a “person[]” as “any human being from the moment of 
fertilization”;13 and, importantly for the present discussion, Californians 
                                            
9 See Rob Stein & Michael Shear, Funding Restored to Groups that Perform 
Abortions, Other Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at A3. 
10 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Lifts Bush’s Strict Limits on Stem Cell 
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/us/politics/10stem.html. 
11 See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Obama to Rescind Bush Abortion Rule, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 28, 2009, at A1. There is also sensible movement in the area of sex education. 
See Sharon Jayson, Obama Budget Shifts Money from Abstinence-only Sex Education; It’s a 
major reversal from Bush’s policies, USA TODAY, May 12, 2009, at D4. Unreasonable 
restrictions in other areas, such as the ban on abortions for soldiers and dependents in 
military hospitals overseas, await reform. 10 U.S.C. § 1093(b) (2009) (forbidding elective 
abortions at medical treatment facilities run by the Department of Defense and ending 
Clinton’s short-lived executive order, 58 Fed. Reg. 6439 (Jan. 22, 1993)). 
12 The vote was 55% to 45% against the measure. See S.D. Sec’y of State, Election 
Night Results (Nov. 12, 2008), http://electionresults.sd.gov/applications/st25cers3/ 
resultsSW.aspx?type=bq. 
13 The vote was 73% to 27% against the initiative. Election Results 2008: 
Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/ 
colorado.html. The Initiative proposed to amend the constitution is as follows: “As used in 
sections 3, 6, and 25 of Article II of the state constitution, the terms ‘person’ or ‘persons’ 
shall include any human being from the moment of fertilization.” Colorado Secretary of 
State, Amendment 48: Formerly Proposed Initiative #36, 
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/Default.aspx?PageMenuID=1230 (last visited Oct. 1, 
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voted against Proposition 4, the Waiting Period and Parental Notice Before 
Termination of Minor’s Pregnancy Initiative.14 These developments suggest 
that now may be the time to take a breath, “dust ourselves off,” in President 
Obama’s inaugural phrase,15 and consider anew the values and topics that 
constitute “talking about abortion.” 
What then might a public conversation about abortion look like—
what topics might we collectively rethink—once the overturn of Roe is 
taken off the table? This article suggests a revision in the terms of the 
debate. As we know, supporters of legal abortion have long been on the 
linguistic defensive, as the vocabulary of “life” and “unborn children” has 
framed how people have come to think about abortion: what it is, whose 
interests are at stake, and whose are incidental.16 There are, however, other 
concepts that might forcefully frame the discussion, I have in mind dignity 
and respect—concepts that in other legal contexts are taken quite seriously 
but that seem to have fallen to the side with regard to women in the context 
of abortion. 
In putting the dignity of women on the table, I recognize that there 
is also ongoing discussion about the dignity of fetus, and that for some this 
is a source of opposition to abortion.17 But the attribution of dignity to 
fetuses and embryos should not undermine the importance of securing 
dignity for women as they exercise their rights under existing law. Abortion 
is a legal medical procedure in the United States and legislation 
                                                                                                     
2009). See also Nicholas Riccardi, Initiatives to Curb Abortions Defeated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
5, 2008, at A18. 
14 The vote was 52% to 48% against the proposal. League of Women Voters of 
California Education Fund, Proposition 4, http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/ 
prop/4/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
15 Barack H. Obama, Presidential Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 
16 For a discussion of the rhetorical advantages of “pro-life” over “pro-choice,” see 
Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 753, 806–07 (2006) [hereinafter Sanger, Legislating in the Culture of Life]. See 
generally CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: THE 
COMMUNICATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1994). 
17 See, e.g., ROBERT GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSON, EMBRYO: IN DEFENSE OF 
HUMAN LIFE 105–09 (2008) (explaining that the destruction of embryos in the course of 
embryonic research is “an assault on human life” and “an assault on human dignity no matter 
the victim’s age or size or stage of development”). Fetal dignity has also served as a basis for 
upholding abortion regulation. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (noting 
that the Partial Birth Abortion Act “expresses respect for the dignity of human life”).  
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criminalizing it is constitutionally prohibited. Yet abortion regulation too 
often proceeds as though this were not quite the case. It is as though 
abortion’s legality is somehow up for grabs and burdening women’s dignity 
in each individual case remains fair game. I am particularly concerned with 
the use of legal processes in this enterprise, and therefore focus on the law’s 
subversion of dignity in connection with a woman’s decision to have an 
abortion. I take as my example a particular category of women—pregnant 
minors—and look at their treatment under a regulatory scheme known as 
the judicial bypass process. This is the requirement that teenagers who want 
to have an abortion without notifying or getting consent from their parents 
must first go to court and convince a judge that they are sufficiently mature 
and informed to make the decision themselves. 
Much current legislation seems premised on the assumption that 
women—both young women and older ones—make decisions about 
abortion lightly, or impulsively, and that if only they were made to reflect 
just a bit longer and with a bit more information, they would change their 
minds. The “bit more” which legislators have sought to convey is a bundled 
set of propositions: that human life begins at conception, that an embryo or 
fetus at any stage of development is “a whole separate, unique, living 
human being”;18 that women who abort will suffer emotional damage for 
the rest of their lives;19 and that women must grasp all of this before they 
can consent to an abortion. This information is relayed through a variety of 
verbal and visual means including scripted physician disclosure statements, 
illustrated brochures of fetal development, and, most recently, the 
requirement that women undergo an ultrasound and “complete a required 
form to acknowledge that she either saw the ultrasound image of her unborn 
                                            
18 For example, doctors in South Dakota must inform their abortion patients that 
abortion ends “the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.” S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1) (b) (2008). See Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D., v. 
Rounds, No. Civ. 05-4077-KES, 2009 WL 2600753, at *2–3 (D.S.D. Aug. 20, 2009) 
(upholding the “Biological Disclosure” requirement). For two excellent critiques, see 
generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 939 (2009) (focusing on the patient’s obligation to listen) and Robert Post, 
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 
2007 U. ILL L. REV 939 (focusing on the physician’s obligation to speak). 
19 S.D. TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK 
FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 41–48 (2005), available at 
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf [hereinafter S.D. TASK FORCE 
REPORT]. 
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child or that she was offered the opportunity and rejected it” before 
consenting to an abortion.20 
The discussion here is guided by a very different premise: that 
women, even young women, understand very well what an abortion is. 
Women understand that abortion ends pregnancy and that if they have an 
abortion, they will not have a baby; that is its very point. The significance 
of this decision may differ from woman to woman and girl to girl. In 
deciding whether or not to continue a pregnancy, each will draw upon her 
own sensibilities, circumstances, and beliefs. But I accept that, as with other 
deeply intimate decisions and commitments—who to marry, whether to 
pray, how to vote—women themselves are able and best positioned to 
decide what is at stake. Of course, leaving the choice to women does not 
mean that abortion decisions are “law-free.” Like other medical decisions 
and like the exercise of other constitutional rights (for abortion distinctively 
partakes of both), abortion decisions are certainly regulated and regulable 
by law. But there are also limiting principles as to how the law should 
intervene, and these include respecting the dignity of she who decides. 
What exactly do I mean by dignity? The term has a variety of 
definitions and uses in constitutional law,21 moral philosophy,22 and in the 
theory and practice of human rights.23 These share in common the general 
view that people “possess an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and 
respected,” and that they should not be subjected to treatment by the state 
that is inconsistent with their intrinsic worth.24 Treatment that disrespects 
human dignity takes many forms, but it is the idea of dignity in connection 
with a decision to exercise a right in court that is my focus here. 
Specifically, what is the relation between the detailed regulation of abortion 
decisions and the right of women to be treated with dignity regarding such a 
decision? The question goes to the heart of what I call decisional dignity: 
the respect owed by law not only to the process of making an abortion 
                                            
20 Woman’s Right to Know Act, ALA. CODE § 26.23A.4 (2009). 
21 See Gerald Neuman, Human Dignity in the United States Constitution, in ZUR 
AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS 250 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000) (presenting 
an historical and topical account of dignity in American constitutional law). 
22 See generally Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS 
520 (1989); Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHIL. 251 (1976). 
23 For a good recent discussion of this topic, albeit somewhat skeptical in tone, see 
generally Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008). 
24 See Neuman, supra note 21, at 249–50. 
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decision but also to the decision itself once it has been made.25 A woman 
who has decided to abort should not as a matter of law be subject to 
disrespectful, harassing, or punitive treatment by virtue of her decision. 
Reva Siegel has shown that dignity offers a forceful basis for 
constitutional analysis.26 But dignitarian concerns also appeal at a more 
instinctive level. There are times when we cannot help but notice that 
something in or about law seems to have gone wrong and that someone is 
being harmed—whether humiliated, disrespected, or punished—in ways 
that seem to put their dignity at stake. Frank Michelman noticed something 
like this in the early 1970s with regard to restrictions on poor people’s 
access to court in civil matters: “Perhaps there is something generally 
demeaning, humiliating, and infuriating about finding oneself in a dispute 
over legal rights and wrongs and being unable to uphold one’s own side of 
the case.”27 At such moments, it is important to take a closer look at what is 
going on and to consider whether such harms are warranted or unfair, 
intended or incidental, and what exactly what law has to do with their 
imposition. 
The aim of approaching the question in this way is to develop a 
broader conceptualization of the harms imposed by law on women who 
seek to end an unwanted pregnancy. Certainly much attention has been paid 
to the kinds of harm women suffer when they are unable to get abortions, or 
harms that were suffered in the pre-Roe days, when they were unable to get 
legal abortions.28 Much attention has also been paid by the pro-life 
movement to what women suffer, or are said to suffer, by virtue of having 
                                            
25 For a discussion of how certain abortion regulation improperly interferes with 
the decision-making process, see generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory 
Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) [hereinafter 
Sanger, Seeing and Believing] (arguing that not only the right to decide about abortion, but 
the deliberative path taken to reaching a decision is protected). 
26 See generally Reva Siegel, The Politics of Protection: A Movement History and 
Dignity Analysis of Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). 
(showing how the Supreme Court’s commitment to women’s dignity implicates both 
substantive due process and equal protection). But see West, supra note 8 (discussing 
negative consequences of the court’s response). 
27 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right 
to Protect One’s Own Rights, Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1174. In this article, Michelman 
explores four jurisprudential values that might have underpinned the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in three Fee Access cases of the early 1970s. These are dignity values, 
participation values, deterrence values, and effectuation values. Id. 
28 See generally RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE (1992); LESLIE REAGAN, 
WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME (1998). 
2009] Decisional Dignity 417 
abortions, whether it is the now-discredited claims about breast cancer29 or 
the promised range of emotional harms, such as guilt, depression, and 
suicide.30 
There has, however, been little public discussion of the harms 
women suffer by virtue of abortion regulation, even when they are, in the 
end, able to obtain a legal abortion. A judicial determination that one or 
another regulation is constitutional (because, in the now familiar language 
of Casey, the regulation does not have “the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion”31) may not answer the 
question of whether a particular regulation has a harmful purpose or effect, 
whether or not it satisfies Casey. Even constitutional regulations may inflict 
objectionable harms on those who have no choice but to comply with them. 
This Article considers the assault on the decisional dignity of young 
women through their participation in the judicial bypass process. Bypass 
hearings provide an instance where a woman’s decision and her dignity 
stand in special relation to one another. Other forms of abortion regulation, 
such as compulsory brochures, waiting periods, or mandatory ultrasounds, 
are often justified in terms of informed consent.32 The idea is that, without 
particular information and sufficient time, a woman does not know enough 
to decide about abortion.33 But bypass hearings work differently. While 
girls are typically questioned about their knowledge of abortion (details of 
                                            
29 See House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Investigating the State of 
Science Under the Bush Administration: Breast Cancer Risks, http://oversight.house.gov/ 
features/politics_and_science/example_breast_cancer.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). In 
2003, the NCI website was changed to report a major study that concluded that “having an 
abortion or miscarriage does not increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast 
cancer.” National Cancer Institute, Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk, 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (last visited Oct. 1, 
2009). 
30 See Elizabeth Shadigian, Reviewing the Evidence, Breaking the Silence: Long-
term Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of Induced Abortion, in THE COST OF 
“CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF ABORTION 63, 68–69 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 
2004) (concluding on the basis of two studies, one Finnish, one U.S., that women have 
higher long-term rates of suicide and self-harm following abortion). See also S.D. TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 33, 43, 50. 
31 Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–78 (1992). 
32 In this regard, there has been a serious blurring by state legislators between 
medically informed consent and what might better be understood as “morally informed 
consent.” See Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 25, at 397–403. 
33 See S.D. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 34–41. 
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the procedure, alternatives, possible consequences), the task before the 
judge is not to provide the petitioner with additional information. Rather, 
the judge is to assess whether the petitioner is mature and informed enough 
to credit the decision she has already made. The teenager’s decision has 
occasioned the hearing in the first place; it takes place only after she has 
formally indicated her intention to end her pregnancy by petitioning the 
court. This structural relationship between decision and regulation gives us 
a chance to consider how the law affects not only the process of abortion 
decision-making but also the consequence of having made the decision. 
What does the law mean to accomplish through the formal 
interrogation of pregnant minors in court? This Article argues that bypass 
hearings serve less to evaluate the quality of a young woman’s decision 
than to punish her for making it. The hearings provide an opportunity to 
inflict a kind of legal harm—harm by process—on young women seeking to 
abort. They produce a civil version of what Malcolm Feeley identified in 
the criminal context as “process as punishment.”34 This is the proposition 
that participation in criminal proceedings, long before trial or conviction, 
can itself be punitive.35 My primary focus is on a form of harm that is 
pervasive but not always immediately apparent. This is the humiliation of 
minors through the mechanism of what I call “compelled narrative”—the 
requirement that minors testify in court about their sexual relationships, 
their pregnancy, and the intricacies of home life that led them to decide not 
to involve parents but to turn to law for relief instead. 
Bypass hearings should concern us specifically, as lawyers and as 
citizens, because of how legal process is used to patrol teenage abortion and 
to harass girls who petition for relief. How does this come about? Hearings 
are supposed to be a source of dignity, not disrespect, a site of justice, not 
harm. Yet there is something intuitively unseemly, perhaps even suspicious, 
about the practice of sending girls to court in these circumstances. As 
Feeley observed with regard to the treatment of low-level criminal 
defendants in pretrial hearings, “[w]hatever majesty there is in the law may 
depend heavily on these encounters”; they are where many people “form 
impressions of the American system of criminal justice.”36 Of course, 
bypass hearings are not criminal; the petitioning minor appears unopposed 
in a civil action. Yet the hearings often seem as if they were criminal, 
particularly to minors—once the “favorites of the law” on account of their 
                                            
34 See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 5 (1992). 
35 Id. at 199–201. 
36 Id. at 5. 
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vulnerability—who have no choice but to encounter law as it is handed to 
them in trial courts around the country. 
With this framework in mind—and keeping an eye on the majesty 
of law—Part II begins with an overview of the bypass system: its 
constitutional origins and key procedural features. These include the 
mechanics of filing, the centrality of confidentiality and speed, the 
standards used to determine a minor’s maturity and best interests, and the 
ever-important burden of proof. It is important to have a sense of these 
basic rules in order to understand how they are implemented by real judges 
and how they are experienced by real girls. 
The Article then turns to the matter of harm. One way to assess 
harm might be to look at the outcome of bypass hearings; are most pregnant 
minors turned down and left to fend for themselves? The answer is no. 
Despite the perplexing quality of a great many decisions in which petitions 
are turned down, almost all petitions that are filed are approved. But that 
seemingly positive news about outcomes distracts attention from the 
injurious content of the hearings themselves. For it is less a hearing’s 
outcome—whether a girl’s petition is granted or denied—than the 
consequences for her by virtue of her participation in the process that is the 
problem. 
Part III explores two specific categories of harm. The first concerns 
the immediate risks of medical delay and public exposure. The second takes 
up the more subtle matter of humiliation and considers just what constitutes 
humiliation for a pregnant teenage girl. Humiliation is often contextually 
contingent in ways that are not universally apparent. As Justice Ruth 
Ginsburg recently observed with regard to the strip search of a middle 
schooler, “[i]t’s a very sensitive age for a girl. I didn’t think my [male] 
colleagues, some of them, quite understood.”37 Attending to the spirit of 
Justice Ginsburg’s observation, this Part looks at the kinds of testimony 
pregnant girls are asked to produce and at the problematic relation between 
testimony, humiliation, and dignity in this fraught context. It also considers 
the stab to dignity when courts refuse, as some do, to hear a girl’s case at 
all. 
Part IV zooms in on a particularly troubling aspect of bypass 
testimony. Depending on the judge—and as we shall see, a great deal 
depends on the judge—bypass petitioners are sometimes urged to do more 
than prove their maturity. In some courts they are also expected to display 
                                            
37 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, May 5, 
2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruth 
ginsburg_N.htm.  
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some form of remorse or moral accountability. Because remorse suggests 
culpability, it is important to understand the nature of the minor’s 
wrongdoing, as well as how she is supposed to overcome it in this context. 
To do this, I consider bypass hearings alongside other hearings involving 
supplicants before the law. These include parole hearings, allocutions 
before sentencing, and the interesting historical example of pardon tales 
from sixteenth century France. Each illuminates the situation of those 
compelled to tell a story in court in order to obtain the benefit of law. That 
task is especially hard in the bypass setting where, as we shall see, the very 
structure of the hearing conveys an element of stealth, and where the 
petitioners’ age and sex limit their performative scope. 
Part V returns to the question of purpose, and I focus on two 
aspects of this: the significant expressive function, social and political, of 
parental involvement legislation and the bypass process as punishment. The 
two fit together, as girls are made to pay a price both for deciding on 
abortion and for everything else they did that led to their present 
predicament. 
But it is not only pregnant minors who are harmed by judicial 
bypass hearings, though they bear the brunt of it. The process also and 
deeply discredits the legal system itself. The remainder of the Article 
examines several ways in which this comes about. The first considers the 
problem of sham hearings, and turns for illumination to a well known 
example from the past: divorce hearings in the days before no-fault, when 
married couples complied with the law’s demands for fault by telling stories 
in court. This Part also considers the unhappy parallels between the current 
bypass process and the hearings held by the House Un-American Activities 
Committee (“HUAC”) in the late 1950s, whose purpose was less to 
establish facts than to shame witnesses compelled to testify.  
Of course not every bypass judge is out to harass or shame pregnant 
girls. Many conscientiously attempt to apply the maturity standard to the 
minors who appear before them. But in a number of counties and 
courtrooms, judges are hostile to bypass cases and sometimes to the 
petitioners themselves. Some judges have included moral verdicts within 
their assessment of a minor’s maturity and others refuse to grant or even to 
hear bypass cases at all. The result is an arbitrariness of access and outcome 
that further discredits the legal system. As discussed in Part VI, forum 
exclusion is particularly obnoxious to law’s legitimacy, producing a 
disillusionment with law by and on behalf of pregnant young women who 
are, after all, entitled to be heard. 
I recognize that hearings for teenagers have always been 
complicated by the nature of juvenile proceedings themselves, which are 
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generally less formal than proceedings for adults and often flavored by the 
sometimes paternalistic, sometimes disciplinary instincts of judges. This has 
been especially true for girls, who were often brought to court for correction 
for behavior relating to sexual unruliness.38 Bypass petitioners bring 
themselves to court, but they too are often treated as though wayward. To 
some extent this may be explained by institutional or generational 
familiarity with the earlier ungovernability model as well as various 
ongoing anxieties associated with girls in trouble. But this is not the entire 
explanation in the bypass context. To understand how these hearings work, 
it is necessary to look as well at the politics of abortion. How those politics 
have made their way into the bypass process becomes clear in nearly every 
section of this Article. How anti-abortion politics has made its way into the 
election of judges is the special subject of Part VII. 
II. JUDICIAL BYPASS HEARINGS 
A. Origins 
Thirty-four states now require that before a pregnant minor can 
have an abortion, she must first either notify or get consent from her parents 
(one or both, depending on the state)39 or successfully petition a judge at the 
confidential hearing known as a judicial bypass hearing. The arrangement 
results from a constitutional compromise concocted by the Supreme Court 
in the 1979 case of Bellotti v. Baird.40 In Roe v. Wade, the Court had held 
that a constitutionally protected right of privacy was “broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
                                            
38 Cheryl Hicks, “In Danger of Becoming Morally Depraved”: Single Black 
Women, Working-Class Black Families, and New York State’s Wayward Minor Laws, 1917–
1928, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2077, 2103 (2003) (citing MARY ODEM, DELINQUENT DAUGHTERS: 
PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1885–
1920 159 (1995) (“[P]arents hoped that the court would help strengthen their flagging 
authority over the social and sexual activities of their teenage daughters.”)). 
39 Twenty-two states require parental consent, eleven require parental notification, 
and four require both. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF 
STATE ABORTION LAWS, OCT. 1, 2009, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. The burden of notification is on the physician performing 
the abortion, rather than the minor. And, in most states, the parents must sign a statement of 
notification or consent which the minor then brings to her doctor. 
40 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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pregnancy.”41 But did the language of Roe regarding women’s decisions 
include “little women” as well? 
The answer emerged from a predictable collision between abortion 
jurisprudence and parental rights. The Supreme Court has long upheld the 
authority of parents to make decisions on behalf of their children, even in 
areas of life about which a teenage child might well have an opinion.42 As 
the Court explained in Bellotti, this decisional superiority derives from the 
sum of several propositions: that children (in general) do not make sound 
decisions; that parents (in general) will decide wisely on their behalf; and 
that whether wise or not, parents have a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in raising their children as they see fit.43 At the same time, as the 
Court had recognized in a 1967 juvenile delinquency proceeding, the 
Constitution also applies to minors: “[W]hatever may be their precise 
impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone.”44 
The tension between conceptions of pregnant girls as juvenile rights 
bearers and pregnant girls as daughters was squarely joined in the context of 
abortion, and in Bellotti the Supreme Court worked out the “precise impact” 
of Roe for girls. Acknowledging that “there are few situations in which 
denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have 
consequences so grave and indelible,”45 the Court held that as with pregnant 
women, no one—not parent, not boyfriend, not whoever the father might 
be—may have an absolute veto over a pregnant girl’s decision to abort. At 
the same time, in consideration of children’s “peculiar vulnerability,” their 
“inability to make critical decisions,” and the importance of the parental 
                                            
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 152 (1973). 
42 The starting point is Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (discussing the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct upbringing and education of children under their 
control. See generally Barbara Woodhouse, Who Owns this Child?: Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992). 
43 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979). 
44 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (extending to minors the rights to counsel, to 
be informed of charges, and to a record in a juvenile proceeding). Minors have since 
acquired other, qualified rights in such areas as criminal procedure, free speech, and in 
certain aspects of procreative liberty, such as obtaining contraception. See Carey v. 
Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (overturning New York’s ban on provision of 
contraceptives to minors under sixteen). New York had argued that the ban furthered “the 
State’s policy against promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young.” Id. at 692. 
45 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642. 
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role in child rearing, states could condition a girl’s decision to abort on the 
consent of her parents.46 
In harmonizing these seemingly antithetical interests—the minor’s 
right to choose and the parent’s right to control—the Court recognized that 
pregnant teens, “especially those living at home,” are vulnerable to parental 
efforts to obstruct their access to abortion.47 To avoid this de facto veto, the 
Court concluded that minors must be given the opportunity to go directly to 
court instead of involving their parents.48 In effect, the decision extends Roe 
to minors provisionally. 
Each year thousands of pregnant teenagers learn, whether by going 
online, visiting a clinic, or through teenage word-of-mouth, that if they want 
an abortion they must first have either a note from home or an order from 
court. As we shall see, it is the cost to minors of getting the court order that 
produces the misuse of law. Of course, not all states require parental 
involvement. Several, such as New York, have no such legislation. In 
others, such as California, Montana, and New Jersey, parental involvement 
statutes have been found to burden a minor’s right to privacy under state 
constitutions.49 But in the states that prefer parental involvement, the price 
extracted is all the more unjustifiable because bypass hearings are not 
required. In a much forgotten footnote in Bellotti v. Baird, the Court 
observed that there is nothing sacrosanct about a judicial hearing as the 
alternative to parental involvement, stating: “We do not suggest, however, 
that a State choosing to require parental consent could not delegate the 
                                            
46 Id. at 623, 634. 
47 Id. at 647 (“It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence 
of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some 
of those who need it the most.”). 
48 Id. at 643–44. The Massachusetts statute challenged in Bellotti required parental 
consent. While a number of states have consent requirements, others require only that 
parents be notified of their daughter’s intent to abort, a seemingly milder form of parental 
participation. Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether a bypass procedure is 
required for notification-only statutes, every notification state but Utah has included a 
judicial bypass provision and the Supreme Court has affirmed that this satisfies any 
constitutional demands. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 454 (1990). The Fourth 
Circuit has opined, however, that because notice is a less burdensome requirement than 
consent, no bypass procedure would be required for its validity. Planned Parenthood of Blue 
Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707, 715–16 (4th Cir. 1997). 
49 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); Lambert v. 
Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 
(N.J. 2000), But see Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1998) (upholding 
Mississippi’s two-parent consent law as constitutional under the State constitution). 
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alternative procedure to a juvenile court or an administrative agency or 
officer.”50 It will be useful to keep the court’s proviso in mind as the nature 
of the hearings unfold. 
B. Operation 
1. The Petition 
The bypass petition, or “application” in some states, generally 
requires the minor to state her age, the fact of her pregnancy (and 
sometimes an estimate of how pregnant she is), and, borrowing language 
from Arizona’s form, an affirmation that she wants to “terminate her 
pregnancy by abortion.”51 In all but two states, parental involvement laws 
apply to all minors under the age of 18: Delaware sensibly exempts minors 
over the age of sixteen,52 and West Virginia defines a minor for bypass 
purposes as “any person under eighteen years who has not graduated from 
high school.”53 
                                            
50 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 n.22. 
51 Ariz. Supreme Court, Abortion, Request by Minor Without Consent of Parent, 
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/selfserv/abortion_forms.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) 
(follow “Petition to Authorize Physician to Perform Abortion”). Some states require the 
minor to specify the statutory grounds on which her petition is based. For example, in 
Arizona she can check off the statement, “I am mature and capable of giving informed 
consent to the proposed abortion,” or the statement, “It is in my best interests to have an 
abortion without the consent of my parent(s), guardian, or conservator.” Id.; ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. Ann. § 36–2152 (2009). In Texas, the minor must check one of three reasons why she 
does not want to notify her parents: that she is “mature enough . . . and know[s] enough 
about abortion to make this decision,” that telling her parent(s) is not in her best interests, or 
that telling her parent(s) “may lead to [her] physical, sexual or emotional abuse.” Tex. Sup. 
Ct., Promulgation of Forms for Use in Parental Notification Proceedings Under Chapter 33 
of the Family Code, available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MiscDocket/99/ 
99924300.pdf; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (Vernon 2009). 
52 Parental Notice of Abortion Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1782 (6) (2009) 
(defining a minor as “a female person under the age of 16”). Exempting teenagers 16 and 
over makes good sense as at least a partial reform of bypass laws. With regard to many areas 
of (more or less) adult life, such as working, leaving school, and engaging in consensual sex, 
sixteen year olds are treated as adults. It would be useful to know as an empirical matter 
whether judges, even sub silentio, take judicial notice of the fact that sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds are mature enough to make an abortion decision; in many courts the answer is 
probably “Yes.” 
53 W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-2 (2009). 
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The petition forms differ from state to state and, in order to help 
minors fill them out properly, a number of states provide instructions (in 
Texas in both English and Spanish).54 The instructions typically respond to 
the specific concerns of teenagers regarding such matters as costs (none), 
confidentiality (promised), and the availability of legal assistance 
(appointed).55 Private agencies, such as the Women’s Law Project in 
Pennsylvania,56 Jane’s Due Process in Texas,57 and various Planned 
Parenthood affiliates,58 also provide information on the legal requirements 
for abortion. Staff at medical clinics, where many minors first learn that 
their own consent is not enough, also provide such information.59 This 
summary of assistance may paint too bright a picture of how the bypass 
                                            
54 See Tex. Sup. Ct., Instructions for Applying to the Court for a Waiver of 
Parental Notification: Parental Notification Rules and Forms, forms 2A, 2B (2007) 
(promulgated pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code §§ 33.003[l], 33.004[c]), available at 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/pnr/pnForms052308.pdf (English version), 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/rules/pnr/spanish33.pdf (Spanish version). The North 
Carolina instructions explain legal vocabulary: “You ask the Court for a waiver by filing a 
‘petition.’ . . . The ‘petition’ is a form that is available in the office of the Clerk of Superior 
Court in every county courthouse.” Administrative Office of the Courts, Petition For Waiver 
Of Parental Consent, AOC-J-601 INS (2004), available at 
http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/nc/nc000452.pdf. North Carolina requires 
that “the minor . . . [be] given assistance in preparing and filing the petition.” Parental or 
Judicial Consent for Abortion, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8 (2009). While this type of 
assistance is helpful, experienced professional guidance is often crucial, as court personnel 
are not always knowledgeable in how to go about the process. 
55 The Texas materials pose and answer three primary questions: what are my 
choices, besides abortion; what are the dangers of having an abortion; and what is it 
important for me to know about the Abortion Parental Notification Law. Tex. Sup. Ct., supra 
note 54. The materials may also explain what happens after a petition is filed: “The clerk will 
set a time for you to meet with a judge. This meeting is called a ‘hearing.’” Id. North 
Carolina, Bypass Form, http://forms.lp.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/nc/nc000452.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
56 WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, YOUNG WOMEN’S GUIDE TO ABORTION IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (2009), available at http://www.womenslawproject.org/brochures/ 
wlp_teen_piece.pdf. 
57 Jane’s Due Process, About Judicial Bypass, 
http://www.janesdueprocess.org/teens/legalrights/judicialbypass (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
58 Planned Parenthood, Judicial Bypass FAQ, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/rocky-mountains/judicial-bypass-faq-10564.htm (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
59 NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE JUDICIAL BYPASS: REPORT ON A 
MEETING 8 (2008) (on file with author). 
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process works in fact. While in some jurisdictions courts and agencies help 
minors in the initial stages of the process, in others the advice handed out 
from court personnel, from clerks to judges, has been inept, inconsistent, 
morally tinged, or nonexistent.60 
After a petition has been filed, unrepresented minors are put in 
touch with a court-appointed or volunteer lawyer. Here, too, follow-through 
is often lacking or mismanaged, even in states like Tennessee that 
specifically provide for the appointment of trained advocates.61 
2. Procedural Features 
In deciding that bypass hearings accommodated the application of 
Roe to minors, the Supreme Court provided a blueprint of sorts, which 
emphasized the constitutional significance of two aspects of the process: 
anonymity and speed.62 Without the assurance of anonymity, the minor 
might be found out by her parents and prevented from petitioning a court or 
seeing a doctor: the de facto veto.63 Without the assurance of speed, she 
might be timed out of the safest methods of early abortion or perhaps lose 
the right altogether.64 It may be helpful to think of minors as possessing 
twinned rights: the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion and 
                                            
60 See HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT 
MINORS 52 (2008) (reporting that “[f]orty percent of Alabama courts, just over 45 percent of 
Tennessee courts, and a whopping 73 percent of Pennsylvania courts proved inadequately 
acquainted with their responsibilities”). 
61 Helena Silverstein et al., Judicial Waivers of Parental Consent for Abortion: 
Tennessee’s Troubles Putting Policy into Practice, 27 LAW & POL’Y 399, 412–17 (2005). 
62 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (“[Bypass hearings] must assure that 
a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity 
and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be 
obtained.”). Some states have stuck to the bare bones of the structure sketched in Bellotti, 
while others, like Texas, have produced significantly more detailed rules and guidelines. See, 
e.g., Ann Crawford McClure et al., A Guide to Proceedings Under the Texas Parental 
Notification Statute and Rules, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 755 (2000). Written by experts on Texas 
procedure, the article was intended as a technical guide for lawyers and judges implementing 
the state’s bypass legislation. Id. at 759. 
63 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644 (“In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision 
requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to [an] ‘absolute, and possibly arbitrary, 
veto.’”). 
64 Id. at 651 n.31 (noting that abortions are most accessible during the first 
trimester). 
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the right to seek a judicial bypass of parental involvement. The second 
effectuates the first. 
i. Anonymity 
The demands of anonymity are met in a number of ways. In all 
states, petitions are captioned by initials or under Jane Doe or Anonymous 
aliases. 65 The hearings are closed to the public,66 although petitioners may 
bring a relative or friend for support. 
Minors are informed that the petition is confidential. North 
Carolina, among other states, alerts minors to an important exception: as 
mandated reporters, judges must report instances of rape or incest to the 
Department of Social Services.67 
Individual states have put other practical safeguards in place. Most 
provide that a minor can designate by what means she (or someone else on 
her behalf) should be contacted regarding the hearing date, ruling, or any 
other official communication such as an appeal.68 Cell phones, beepers, and 
                                            
65 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904(2) (a) (2009) (requiring that the probate 
court “upon its first contact with a minor seeking a waiver . . . provide [her] with notice of 
[her] right to . . . [c]onfidentiality of the proceedings, including the right to use initials in the 
petition”). States use different methods to keep track of the true identity of petitioners. 
Arizona, for example, permits the petition to be signed by a true name, initials, or fictitious 
name; the petition is accompanied by a “Data Sheet” which states the minor’s true name if 
she has used an alias. 2009 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV., ch. 172 (H.B. 2564) (West), to be codified at 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2152[B],[E], petition and data sheet available at 
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/selfserv/Abortion%20Forms/DataSheet.pdf. Texas uses a 
similar system: a cover page with a Jane Doe designation and a “verification page” with the 
minor’s actual name. See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct., Parental Notification Rules and Forms, Rule 2, 
Proceedings in the Trial Court (2007), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ 
rules/pdf/SCAC_Chapter_33_Rules_Forms.pdf. 
66 See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct., supra note 54, at Form 1A (“[t]he only persons allowed 
to be [at your hearing] are you, your guardian ad litem, your lawyer, court staff, and any 
person whom you request to be there. . . . No one [except the court] can inspect the 
evidence.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.904(2) (g) (2009). It is not uncommon for a 
minor to bring a parent. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 678 So.2d 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) 
(petitioner’s mother accompanied her daughter to the hearing, even though the mother’s 
religious beliefs prevented her from consenting to the abortion). In that case the mother also 
testified that she would take her daughter for the abortion and care for her during her 
recovery. The trial court denied the petition. Id. at 784. 
67 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8 (f) (2009) 
68 The Texas instructions explain that “you may list a phone, pager, beeper, or fax 
number, or other way that you can be contacted,” emphasizing that “[i]t is very important 
that you provide this information because the court may later need to contact you about your 
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pagers have helped greatly in this regard. Minors have also been alerted to 
be mindful of their computer history. 69 In Texas, if a bypass petition is filed 
by fax, court personnel are required to “take all reasonable steps” to 
maintain its confidentiality so that the form does not sit out on the office fax 
machine.70 Heightened concern regarding the confidentiality of the forms is 
well justified, as in some states, the petitions or accompanying 
documentation may contain facts about the minor’s history (or fear) of 
abuse or incest, the date of conception, and the date and location of her 
intended abortion.71 Publicity around any of these might put a minor or her 
plans at risk. 
ii. Speed 
Time is a critical factor in the bypass context. As the Ninth Circuit 
explained, “if the abortion decision is hindered or burdened during the 
earlier stages of pregnancy, the performance of an abortion may be delayed 
until such time as the state can more extensively regulate the exercise of a 
woman’s constitutional right.”72 The requirements of timeliness are met in a 
number of ways. Bypass petitions typically receive docketing priority on 
court calendars. In addition, most states have prescribed maximum periods 
during which a ruling on the petition must be handed down.73 In 
                                                                                                     
application. If you cannot be contacted, your application will be denied.” Tex. Sup. Ct., 
supra note 54. 
69 Jane’s Due Process advises minors trying to learn about pregnancy options: “If 
someone might check to see what you’ve been doing online, it’s safest to use a computer at a 
friend’s house, library, or other place that you trust to keep your information private.” Jane’s 
Due Process, Homepage, http://www.janesdueprocess.org/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
70 McClure et al., supra note 62, at 800 (describing Rule 1.5(a)). 
71 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.152 (2008); IOWA CT. RULES 8.34, JUVENILE 
PROCEDURE FORM 1, available at http://www.iowacourts.gov/wfdata/frame2943-1593/ 
File5.pdf. 
72 Glick v. McKay, 937 F.2d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, because 
Nevada’s parental notification law did not specify a fixed time period, it failed to meet the 
expediency requirement established in Akron II and Bellotti), overruled on other grounds by 
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997). 
73 See Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1109–10 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(Louisiana’s failure to set an outside time limit for the juvenile court’s ruling or to provide 
constructive authorization in the absence of a ruling failed to provide the expeditious 
proceedings required by Bellotti); Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates Ass’n. v. Pearson, 716 
F.2d. 1127, 1135–37 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that because an Indiana statute failed to 
mention the appellate process at all, expeditious consideration of appeals was not “assured”). 
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Mississippi, it is no more than seventy-two hours after the petition is filed;74 
in North Carolina, no more than seven days.75 A judge’s failure to rule 
within the specified time (the “pocket veto”) results in a default judgment 
granting the petition.76 Such default or “deemed granted” provisions can be 
tremendously important in counties where judges are reluctant to be 
associated with successful bypass petitions.77 
Despite these schedules, in states that grant maximum periods for 
trial court and appellate decisions, it can take up to three full weeks from 
filing the petition to the court’s final ruling.78 This is a significant period in 
the context of pregnancy. Requiring any woman seeking an abortion to 
remain pregnant for three additional weeks after her decision has been made 
may well have both medical and psychological implications for her.79 
3. Maturity and Best Interest Standards 
Bypass judges are charged with resolving two basic questions.80 
The first is whether the petitioning minor has proven that she is mature and 
informed enough to make an abortion decision. If the judge finds that she 
has, he must grant her petition. If the judge finds that she has not, then he 
must resolve a second question: even if the minor’s decisional competence 
is lacking, is an abortion nonetheless in her best interest? If the answer to 
                                            
74 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55(3) (2009). 
75 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(d) (2009). 
76 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.8(d) (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-55 (3) 
(2009). 
77 NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 15 (discussing the 
electoral and moral difficulties faced by many judges and describing how a judge could 
publicly “refuse to sign an order . . . knowing that, in a short period of time, it would be 
granted”). 
78 Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Ohio’s judicial-bypass procedure can consume up to three 
weeks of a young woman’s pregnancy.”); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.85(B) (1) 
(2009) (requiring the trial court to make its decision within five business days after the minor 
files her complaint); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2505.073(A) (2009) (requiring the court of 
appeals to docket an appeal within four days after the minor files a notice of appeal); OHIO 
RULE APP. PROC. 14(A) (requiring the court of appeals to render a decision within five days 
after docketing the appeal). 
79 I thank Imogen Goold for this insight. 
80 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647–48 (1979). 
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this question is yes, the judge must grant the petition. If the judge thinks an 
abortion is not in her best interests, the minor’s petition is denied. At this 
point, putting aside an appeal, the petitioner who has been deemed too 
immature to decide to have an abortion is left by law to have a baby. 
What standards do courts use to determine whether a minor is 
mature? As the Supreme Court noted in Bellotti, maturity is “difficult to 
define, let alone determine. . . . The peculiar nature of the abortion decision 
requires . . . a case-by-case evaluation.”81 Some states have provided trial 
judges with statutory guidance. Pennsylvania provides that “the court shall 
hear evidence relating to the maturity, intellect and understanding of the 
pregnant woman, the fact and duration of her pregnancy, the nature, 
possible consequences and alternatives to abortion, and any other evidence 
the court may find useful.”82 Texas also focuses on the process by which a 
decision is reached: its Supreme Court held that “the evidence [must] 
demonstrate[] that the minor is capable of reasoned decision-making and 
that her decision is not the product of impulse, but is based upon the careful 
consideration of the various options open to her and the benefits, risks, and 
consequences of those options.”83 As to whether a minor is “sufficiently 
well informed,” the Texas criteria are typical: the minor must show that she 
has learned about medical risks from a health care professional, understands 
those risks, knows there are alternatives to abortion, and is aware of its 
emotional and psychological implications.84 
Despite the articulation of general standards, there is significant 
discretion in their application. In explaining the vast discrepancies in bypass 
                                            
81 Id. at 644. 
82 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(f) (2009). See also Satsie Veith, The Judicial Bypass 
Procedure and Adolescents’ Abortion Rights: The Fallacy of the ‘Maturity’ Standard, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 453 (1994). 
83 In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Tex. 2000). As to whether a minor is 
“sufficiently well informed,” Texas requires a showing that the minor has obtained 
information about health risks from a health care professional and understands them, that she 
understands the alternatives to abortion, and that she is aware of the emotional and 
psychological implications of abortion. Id. See also In re Anonymous 964 So.2d 1239 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2007) (affirming denial of petition of minor whose testimony “did not indicate that 
she had discussed with a doctor, a nurse, or a counselor any potential psychological or 
emotional problems that might arise after having an abortion”). But see In re Doe, 19 S.W. 
3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2000) (information about the psychological consequences of abortion need 
not be received from licensed professional counselors so long as it is from “reliable and 
informed sources”).  
84 Id. at 256. 
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outcomes by county, one Ohio judge noted simply: “My view of maturity is 
not someone else’s view of maturity.” Ohio bypass attorney Alphonse 
Gerhardstein put it slightly differently: “We’re starved for standards 
because everyone thinks they have the answer.”85 
If a minor is found to be insufficiently mature or informed, how do 
courts determine her best interests? In some states, the question is whether 
an abortion—full stop—is in the immature minor’s best interest. Other 
states put the question differently and ask whether an abortion without 
notification to a parent is in the best interests of the minor. Thus, in a 
Nebraska case, a thirteen-year-old who “lives with her parents, has never 
lived on her own, and has never handled her personal finances or held 
employment other than a summer job detasseling corn” failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that she was sufficiently mature, or that an 
abortion without notifying her parents would be in her best interest.86 But 
under either formulation, the answer in almost every published case has 
been no. 
As with maturity, the standards for best interests are also quite 
roomy. The Florida Supreme Court has listed among the factors to be 
considered: 
the minor’s emotional or physical needs; the possibility of 
intimidation, other emotional injury, or physical danger to the 
minor; the stability of the minor’s home and the possibility that 
notification would cause serious and lasting harm to the family 
structure; the relationship between the parents and the minor and 
the effect of notification on that relationship; and the possibility 
that notification may lead the parents to withdraw emotional and 
financial support from the minor.87 
Some states have urged common sense in the application of 
standards. A Kansas court cautioned that “the examining court must weigh 
                                            
85 See Catherine Candisky & Randall Edwards, Abortion Waivers are a Judicial 
Crapshoot, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 29, 1993, at 1A [hereinafter Candisky & 
Edwards, Abortion Waivers]; Steven F. Stuhlbarg, When is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When 
is an Abortion in her Best Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio’s Abortion 
Parental Notification Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 907 (1992); see also Suellyn Scarneccia & 
Julie Kunce Fields, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 
3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 98–101 (1995) (proposing a set of standardized questions for 
judges in Michigan). 
86 In re Anonymous I, 558 N.W.2d. 784, 788 (Neb. 1997) (per curiam). 
87 In re Doe, 973 So.2d 548, 553 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008). 
432 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 18:2 
[the minor’s] situation not against the ideal but against a standard of basic 
understanding of her situation, her choices, and her options.”88 
4. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review 
A critical issue for trial court judges is whether the petitioning 
minor, as the moving party, has met the burden of proof regarding her 
maturity or best interests.89 (Keep in mind that the minor is also the only 
party.)90 Most states have adopted the “preponderance of the evidence” test 
typically used in civil actions.91 Yet other states, like Nebraska and Arizona, 
apply the higher “clear and convincing” standard.92 There seems to be a 
sense in these states that girls “have it easy” going into a bypass hearing, 
which an Arizona court characterized as “a proceeding that encroaches on a 
parent’s ability to exercise [traditional authority]” over a child.93 In the case 
of In re B.S., the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that because minors 
are both unopposed and represented by counsel, the higher standard 
“avoid[s] making judicial bypass a mere pass-through proceeding.”94 In 
addition, the Arizona court explained that the “magnitude of the presented 
issue” justified departing from the normal preponderance standard, because 
abortion involves “intensely personal interests,” granting the petition (too 
                                            
88 In re Doe, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). 
89 See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding 
an Ohio statute placing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the minor). Where state 
statutes have been silent on the burden of proof, courts have assigned it to minors, noting 
that Akron simply follows the general rule in civil cases that the party asserting the 
affirmative of an issue bears the burden of proving it. See In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 289 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003); see also In re Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997); In re 
Anonymous, 833 So. 2d 75, 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); In re Jane Doe IV, 19 S.W.3d 337, 
339 (Tex. 2000). 
90 The exception is Alabama, where one judge has appointed a guardian ad litem 
for the fetus. Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, a Minor: Fetal Representation 
in Hearings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 77–
80 (2001) [hereinafter Silverstein, Anonymous]. 
91 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (i) (2009). 
92 In re Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Neb. 1997); In re B.S., 74 P.3d 285, 
289 (Ariz. 2003). 
93 In re B.S., 74 P.3d at 290. 
94 Id. at 289 (citing Akron Center, 497 U.S. at 516 (allowing the clear and 
convincing standard “when, as here, the bypass procedure contemplates an Ex parte 
proceeding at which no one opposes the minor’s testimony”)). 
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easily) would have “irreversible consequences” for the minor.95 Of course, 
not granting the petition also has irreversible consequences that are 
intensely personal, and about which the minor has already made a decision. 
Nonetheless, the court’s explanations reveal how judicial attitudes about 
abortion permeate even the procedural aspects of the bypass process. 
As with the burden of proof, the sense that bypass petitioners have 
an abundance of procedural advantages has influenced courts in other 
matters as well. In 2001, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed an earlier 
decision that undisputed bypass testimony must be accepted as true, noting 
that “where a minor seeks a waiver of parental consent for an abortion and 
no adverse party cross-examines her . . . a rule compelling acceptance of 
undisputed live testimony as true—without affording any deference to the 
trial court’s ability to . . . assess the demeanor of the witness—is 
unsound.”96 There is no adverse party in a bypass hearing because of its 
distinctive constitutionally constituted nature, although, as we shall see, 
some judges do examine petitioners in a prosecutorial manner. 
In most states the standard of review on appeal is abuse of 
discretion: a denial will be reversed only when the trial court’s decision is 
“plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust.”97 Here too abortion politics flavor 
what this means. As a dissenting Alabama judge candidly stated, 
“[r]eligious opposition to abortion in this state is so pervasive and 
intransigent that we need a standard of review on appeal that will 
differentiate effectively between those judgments based on the evidence and 
the law and those based on nonjudicial factors.”98 
C. Outcomes and the Nature of Harm 
Since bypass hearings were first introduced in the late 1970s, 
petitions have been denied for reasons that, on any fair reading of the facts, 
are simply hard to take. In 2001, an Alabama judge held that because sex 
education was taught in the public high school, the minor’s “action[s] in 
becoming pregnant . . . [are] indicative that she has not acted in a mature 
and well informed manner”;99 another minor was declared immature 
                                            
95 Id. 
96 Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542, 546 (Ala. 2001) (emphasis added). 
97 Id. at 547. 
98 Ex parte Anonymous, 812 So.2d 1234, 1240 (2001) (Johnstone, J., dissenting). 
99 In re Anonymous, 684 So. 2d 1337, 1338 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). An Ohio trial 
court similarly denied the petition of a minor who was days away from her eighteenth 
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because “she engaged in sexual intercourse ‘with her [college] scholarship 
on the line.’”100 A Mississippi court denied the bypass petition of a college-
bound seventeen-year-old, who testified that she would not be able to give 
up a baby for adoption because she had lost her own mother to cancer five 
years earlier, on the grounds that the girl was “simply afraid of the 
responsibility of motherhood.”101 A Texas trial court turned down the 
petition of a seventeen year old who had researched abortion and its 
alternatives, had consulted with several counselors (including her home 
economics teacher and three formerly pregnant teenagers), and had chosen 
to look at the fetus on an ultrasound in order to confront her decision 
directly, on the grounds that “she did not understand the intrinsic benefits of 
keeping the child or of adoption.”102 An Ohio court found that a minor who 
already had one child lacked maturity because she had failed to file a 
paternity action against that child’s father.103 (There is at present no 
exemption for teens who are already mothers; they too must notify or get 
consent from their own parents.)104 An Alabama court denied the petition of 
a seventeen-year-old cheerleader who supported herself with a full-time job 
and who had testified that she was “emotionally and mentally prepared [for 
an abortion], and if there were any complications she would go immediately 
to her doctor.”105 As a frustrated appellate judge remarked in a similar case, 
                                                                                                     
birthday, taking college preparatory classes, and working to save for college on the grounds 
that her pregnancy alone indicated insufficient maturity. In re Jane Doe, 613 N.E.2d 1112, 
1114–1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
100 In re Anonymous, 905 So.2d 845, 848 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (upholding trial 
court decision). The court also based its ruling on the fact that “seeing the difficulties 
encountered by friends who have become pregnant, [the petitioner] got ‘herself into the same 
situation.’” Id. 
101 In re A.W., 826 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Miss. 2002). 
102 In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. 2000). 
103 Cleveland Surgi-Center Inc. v. Jones, 2 F.3d 686, 689 (6th Cir. 1993), cert 
denied, 510 U.S. 1046 (1994). 
104 The exemption of pregnant teenage mothers from parental involvement laws is 
an area overripe for reform. If anyone knows what is at stake in a decision to have a child, it 
is surely mothers. See Rachel K. Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like, 
Everything in the World”: How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who Have 
Abortions, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 79, 80 (2008). There is some irony in holding that a young 
mother is too immature to make an abortion decision about having another child; she is, after 
all, already legally responsible for all decisions regarding the children she already has. See 
Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFFALO L. REV. 785 (2000). 
105 In re Anonymous, 650 So. 2d. 923, 925 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). 
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“[w]e can safely say, having considered the record, that, should this minor 
not meet the criteria for ‘maturity’ under the statute, it is difficult to imagine 
one who would.”106 These cases remind one of the old southern literacy 
tests designed to keep black citizens from registering to vote. As a fifty-
seven year old farmer, who tried unsuccessfully to register in 1954 and 
1961 and then gave up, told an interviewer, he “had done his best and does 
not think that he could do any better.”107 
In none of the bypass cases just discussed did the trial court decide 
that despite finding the minor was immature, an abortion was in her best 
interest. And while some of these cases were reversed on appeal, not all 
cases are reversed, or are even appealed. As Malcolm Feeley has pointed 
out in the criminal context, in terms of the significance for the individual, 
“for all practical purposes, the lower courts of first instance are also courts 
of last resort.”108 The result in many bypass cases is that by the end of the 
formal hearing, girls deemed to lack the maturity to decide about abortion 
are thrown back on those same resources to proceed toward motherhood. 
Of course, we do not know the actual end to bypass cases. Minors 
whose petitions are granted may change their minds, as certain Alabama 
judges regularly urge petitioners in that state. 109 Nor can we be certain what 
happens when a petition is denied—whether disappointed young women try 
again in another court or another state,110 whether they travel to a non-
bypass state, or whether they become mothers. We know very little about 
what happens to the girls in this last category: whether they continue to live 
at home, or raise their babies by themselves, or marry, or place their 
children up for adoption. 
Ungrounded denials of bypass petitions of the sort described 
above—decisions in which judges declare well-informed young women 
immature for the purpose of defeating their decision to abort—excite our 
sense of injustice. The decisions appear to be stubborn misapplications of 
                                            
106 In re Anonymous, 515 So.2d 1254, 1256 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). 
107 Brian K. Landsberg, Sumpter County, Alabama and the Origins of the Voting 
Rights Act, 54 ALA. L. REV. 877, 904 (2003). 
108 FEELEY, supra note 34, at 33. 
109 Silverstein, Anonymous, supra note 90, at 99–100. 
110 The Sixth Circuit has upheld the filing of sequential petitions. In Cincinnati 
Women’s Servs. Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006), the Court held that an Ohio 
parental consent statute limiting a minor to a single petition unduly burdened a minor whose 
circumstances changed such that she would be able to meet requirements of demonstrating 
increased maturity or increased medical knowledge. Id. at 369–71. 
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the standards by judges who may disapprove of abortion, disapprove of the 
young woman, or perhaps both. But although these unprincipled denials rile 
us up, they also serve to divert our attention from an aspect of the process 
that is as troubling and far more pervasive.111 This is the set of harms 
inflicted on young women whose petitions are approved and who by that 
measure might be considered bypass success stories. Over the last twenty 
years, appellate courts have clarified the meaning of statutory standards so 
that fewer judges are able to disregard the record without being reversed on 
appeal. The result is that in most states, almost all girls willing to go to 
court can, in the long run, get judicial permission to have the abortions they 
seek. 
But if nearly all bypass petitioners succeed, where is the harm? 
Proponents of California’s 2008 parental involvement ballot measure 
insisted in their campaign materials that “out of millions of girls, the 
opposition [to Proposition 4] couldn’t find ONE REAL GIRL harmed by a 
notification law.”112 Moreover, if bypass hearings are here to stay—as the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly and grumpily assured us is constitutionally 
the case113—perhaps the present state of affairs is not so bad from a 
practical perspective. Yes, there must be a hearing, but apparently most 
girls are able to negotiate their way through one, and sooner or later their 
                                            
111 A five-year study of Minnesota bypass hearings revealed that out of 3,573 
petitions, nine were denied, six were withdrawn, and 3,558 were granted. Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 436 n.21 (1990). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
noted in 1997 that judicial approval is nearly a certainty. Out of 15,000 cases in 
Massachusetts heard by the year 2000, only 13 were denied and 11 of those were reversed on 
appeal. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Att’y Gen., 677 N.E.2d 101, 105 (Mass. 
1997). Planned Parenthood reports that during 2007, in six of its regional offices (the Rocky 
Mountains, Southeast Virginia, Bucks County and Central Pennsylvania, and Mid and South 
Michigan), out of 150 bypass petitions sought, none were denied. Richard Blum, Planned 
Parenthood, Judicial Bypass, Dec. 10, 2008 (presentation on file with author). 
112 League of Women Voters of California Education Fund, Proposition 4, 
http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/state/prop/4/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). Opponents 
of Prop 4 suggested that girls who faced telling abusive parents might attempt illegal 
abortions, or even suicide. Id. See also Sarah’s Law, Yes on 4, http://www.yeson4.net/ (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
113 As the Court noted in summarily rejecting a constitutional challenge to a 
parental involvement statute in Casey, “[w]e have been over most of this ground before.” 
Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). In contrast, in a number of 
states, such as Montana, Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997), California, Am. 
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997), and New Jersey, Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000), parental involvement statutes 
have been found to burden a minor’s right to privacy.  
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petitions are granted. The hurdle is high, but if most can clear it, what’s the 
problem? What more is there to think about? 
I suggest that there is a great deal more to think about, for it is the 
hearings themselves, and not just their outcomes, that are the misuse of law. 
Some of the harms faced by minors are concrete, such as the immediate 
problems of delay and public exposure. Other harms are less tangible, if no 
less important. These are the consequences to a vulnerable young person of 
compulsory participation in a high stakes hearing regarded by some as the 
price she has to pay. 
III. HARM TO MINORS 
A great deal is put at stake by a minor’s participation in the bypass 
process. In addition to whether or not the minor is to become a mother, this 
Section looks at the risks to her health, her well-being, and to her dignity. 
A. The Risks of Delay 
The medical consequences of delay are more serious in the case of 
teenagers, who already tend to acknowledge and confirm their pregnancies 
later than adults.114 We understand the mix of causes: irregular periods, 
teenage denial and procrastination skills, and the childlike hope for a 
miracle. Nonetheless, the additional delay generated by the hearing (and 
possible appeal) means that some girls may have to undergo more elaborate 
abortion procedures and others risk being timed out of a legal abortion 
altogether.115 After the Alabama Supreme Court remanded a case giving the 
trial judge twelve more days to “detail sufficiently the basis for appropriate 
findings” by conducting another hearing,116 Justice Johnstone observed that 
“the mind-set of the trial court apparent from the record forebodes that a 
remand will not yield a different judgment but only a more legally sufficient 
                                            
114 See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatricians, Committee on Adolescence, The 
Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care When Considering Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 746, 
749 (1996). 
115 The nature of the abortion procedure has additional logistical implications. 
Clinics typically require an adult to pick up any patient if anesthesia is used; this necessarily 
complicates arranging transportation or accompaniment. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & 
FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 5. For an excellent account of how teenagers help one another by 
driving, waiting, being kind, see PATRICIA HERSCH, A TRIBE APART: A JOURNEY INTO THE 
HEART OF AMERICAN ADOLESCENCE, 194–205 (1999). 
116 Ex parte Anonymous, 889 So.2d 518, 520 (Ala. 2003). 
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rationale for denying relief. All the while the time for a safe abortion will be 
ticking by.”117 
The importance of timing is not lost on minors. A Texas teenager 
who could have avoided a hearing by waiting just a few weeks until her 
eighteenth birthday instead petitioned the court to secure an abortion at the 
earliest stage of her pregnancy.118 In reversing the trial court’s denial of her 
petition before publishing its full opinion, the Texas Supreme Court 
explained that “Doe was entitled to a bypass and out of concern that any 
further delay might expose her further [medical] risk . . . [w]e made our 
decision [to issue the order immediately] on the side of the minor’s 
safety.”119 
Worries over the cost of an abortion may also deter a minor from 
acting. A Pennsylvania minor in foster care delayed petitioning because of 
“confusion among staff” in the Department of Human Services (her 
custodian) as to whether it would pay for an abortion.120 Once advised the 
Department would pay, the minor immediately filed, but her petition was 
denied on the grounds that, medical evidence notwithstanding, her 
pregnancy was too developed.121 Though it was reversed on appeal, the case 
underscores the crucial significance for law of timing and dates. As the 
Women’s Law Project in Philadelphia counsels teens, “[d]o not delay 
calling for an appointment just because you haven’t raised the full fee.”122 
The Pennsylvania case also highlights the particular problems of 
pregnant minors in state care. Florida policy forbids social workers from 
authorizing an abortion for anyone under the supervision of the Department 
of Child and Family Services.123 Because most foster children are unable or 
                                            
117 Id. at 520. (Johnstone, J., concurring). Justice Johnstone concurred because “a 
remand leaves [the minor] with a theoretical hope” and “will allow [her] further opportunity 
to introduce even more evidence of her maturity, knowledge, and best interests.” Id. 
118 In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 356 n.11 (Tex. 2000). 
119 Id. at 354. 
120 In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714, 715 (Pa. 2003). 
121 Id. 
122 WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 56, at 2. A few private organizations 
attempt to fund abortions for indigent women, young and old; for more, see National 
Network of Abortion Funds, Connecting Rights to Resources, http://www.nnaf.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
123 Carl Hiaasen, DCF Policy: Forcing Babies to Have Babies, MIAMI HERALD, 
May 1, 2005, at 1L (commenting on case of L.G.); see also Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 
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unwilling to involve their actual parents, the inability of foster parents or 
social workers to consent places a near impossible burden on a minor’s 
access to abortion. Other categories of pregnant teenagers find themselves 
similarly stymied. These include both minors living informally with 
grandparents or other relatives124 and minors whose parents are physically 
absent—whether in prison, in the armed services, or in another country—
and therefore may be unable to participate in a timely way. Other parents 
may be present in the United States illegally and afraid to sign an official 
paper, especially one that must be notarized.125 
The problem of delay is intensified by the operation of bypass 
process itself. As the painstaking state-by-state investigations of Helena 
Silverstein have made clear, in many counties the official players in the 
system, from court clerks to judges, often know very little about the 
hearings: what they are, what the state is obligated to provide, how minors 
are to proceed, and so on.126 Within any one state, practices often differ 
county to county, courthouse to courthouse, and judge to judge, further 
complicating the ability of lawyers to prepare their clients. 
There is also the sheer difficulty of actually getting to court. Judges 
have heard testimony from petitioners who hitchhiked 40 miles over the 
course of four hours to get to the hearing on time. As one lawyer stated, 
“it’s difficult enough for a young woman to have to get out of school, come 
to a lawyer, get to the courthouse by 4:30 p.m. (usually earlier so we can 
catch a judge) and [to] do that a couple of times before the process is 
finished; so I can’t even imagine if they have to drive 300 miles.”127 
This account puts to the side the difficulties of arranging and 
traveling to an abortion provider once a petition is granted.128 Consider that, 
in Nebraska, the only three medical clinics that provide abortions in the 
                                                                                                     
901 (Ala. 1988) (reviewing state foster care agency’s refusal to authorize a minor’s 
abortion). 
124 See, e.g., In re R.B., 790 So.2d 830 (Miss. 2001) (upholding the denial of a 
waiver of parental consent where the minor’s parents were dead and she was living with her 
grandmother); In re Anonymous, 812 So.2d 1221 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (upholding the 
denial of a waiver where the minor’s grandmother was her legal guardian). 
125 NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 10–12. 
126 See generally SILVERSTEIN, supra note 60. Silverstein acknowledges that things 
may have improved since she began her study. Id. 
127 Id. at 5. 
128 Id. 
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state are 450 miles or more from the state’s western border; that two thirds 
of Georgia’s providers are in Atlanta; and that Michigan has no providers 
above the thumb.129 
The is also much we cannot consider because we simply don’t 
know. The fact that most petitions are granted tells us almost nothing at all 
about how many girls are unable to petition in a timely way or who they 
are: their age, race, education, and family circumstances. We do know, 
however, that there are states, such as Mississippi, which have high teenage 
pregnancy rates and low teenage abortion rates, and where only a few 
bypass petitions are filed annually.130 
B. The Risk of Public Exposure 
Despite the constitutional significance of anonymity, a minor’s 
physical participation in the bypass process puts her at risk of exposure. As 
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in striking down that state’s parental 
notification law, the logistics of traveling to court, getting the forms, 
returning for the hearing, and waiting around outside the courtroom may 
compromise the young woman’s anonymity.131 Co-members of the 
community appearing in court to pay a parking fine or take out a hunting 
license may wonder what Jane is doing down there in the middle of the day. 
Bypass petitioners have bumped into schoolmates attending their own 
juvenile court hearings and parents have received anonymous letters from 
neighbors who saw their daughter in court.132 In this regard, the availability 
of electronic forms and instructions is a huge help to minors—at least 
minors with printers—who can avoid the additional trip. It is worth noting 
that even minors who involve their parents cannot do so completely within 
                                            
129 Id. at 4. 
130 Telephone Interview with Rachel Rebouché, Associate Director, Judicial 
Bypass Protect, National Partnership for Women & Families (Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
131 Planned Parenthood of N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 636 (N.J. 2000). 
132 Id. In Massachusetts, minors are at the courthouse for approximately two hours 
and before a judge for between fifteen and thirty minutes; this is not an insubstantial time to 
have to account for one’s activities. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Att’y Gen., 677 
N.E.2d 101, 105 n.6 (Mass. 1997). 
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the confines of family privacy; at least six states require that parental 
signatures on notification and consent forms must also be notarized.133 
There is also the ethically charged problem of what I call 
“revelation through appeal.” This occurs when an appellate opinion 
incorporates so much factual information from the trial record that despite 
the Jane Doe alias, the petitioner’s identity is susceptible to discovery. The 
problem of the decision itself compromising anonymity was the subject of 
ferocious debate among the justices of the Texas Supreme Court. 
Concurring in a 2000 bypass case, Justice Enoch challenged Justice Hecht 
for his “routine practice of revealing to the public ‘in complete detail’ the 
minor’s testimony . . . for no apparent jurisprudential purpose.”134 Justice 
Enoch observed that, in a series of decisions, Hecht had written separately 
in order to “publish chapter and verse the minor’s confidential testimony. It 
would appear that Justice Hecht intends nothing more than to punish, as 
best he personally can, minors for seeking a judicial bypass. Although the 
law promises them confidentiality, he promises them notoriety.”135 
It is important to remember what is at stake in abortion notoriety. It 
is not only that a minor’s parents may prevent her from going to a court or 
to a clinic. As Judge Richard Posner noted in refusing to release even the 
redacted medical records of late-term abortion patients, “skillful 
‘Googlers’” might be able to “put two and two together, ‘out’ the . . . 
women, and thereby expose them to threats, humiliation, and obloquy.”136 
Similar concern was raised by the Fourth Circuit in a 2002 case concerning 
the confidentiality of medical records sought by the state: 
[W]omen seeking abortions in South Carolina have a great deal 
more to fear than stigma. The protests designed to harass and 
intimidate women from entering abortion clinics, and the 
                                            
133 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-803 (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705 
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740.2 (2009); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-7 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (2009). 
134 In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 363 (Tex. 2000) (Enoch, J., concurring). 
135 Id. at 363. Justice Enoch felt particularly stymied by Hecht’s practices, stating 
that “[Hecht’s] disclosures leave the Court in an untenable position. The Court cannot 
respond because to do so would require it to reveal whatever other pieces of the record 
remain confidential.” Id. 
136 N.W. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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violence inflicted on abortion providers, provide women with 
ample reason to fear for their physical safety.137 
Pro-life groups have videotaped abortion patients entering medical 
clinics and posted their pictures on the web.138 Others have turned over the 
names of minors entering clinics to law enforcement, arguing that the fact 
of their pregnancy is prima facie evidence of statutory rape.139 
Even if the townsfolk are not out with pitchforks (or mini-cams), 
reputational consequences may attach from the revelation of pregnancy 
alone. Gossip about that subject is always interesting and has long been a 
basis of reputational injury.140 A minor is sometimes just as concerned 
about her parents finding out she has had sex as she is about her parents 
finding out that she is pregnant; pregnancy is the evidence that the girl is 
not the trustworthy kind of daughter her parents thought she was.141 Once a 
pregnancy is revealed, neighbors, friends, and church members will know 
that she has had sex, that she was not smart or careful about it, and that no 
boy has stepped forward to make things right.142 
There are separate reputational implications for having or seeking 
an abortion. There is some evidence of decreasing support for legal abortion 
                                            
137 Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Comm’r, S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 
317 F.3d 357, 377 (4th Cir. 2002). 
138 Yochi Dreazan, In the Shadows: Photos of Women Who Get Abortions Go Up 
on Internet, WALL ST. J. May 28, 2002, at A1 (reporting postings of women’s pictures on 
Abortioncams.com and Christiangallery.com). 
139 David Pasztor, Abortion Foes Involve Police in New Tactic, AUSTIN AM. 
STATESMAN, Dec. 29, 2002, at A1. 
140 See also Mary Beth Norton, Gender and Defamation in Seventeenth-Century 
Maryland, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1987). 
141 “They are here because they don’t want their parents to know that they are less 
than perfect.” Catherine Candisky & Randall Edwards, Pregnant Jane Does Often 
Intelligent, Scared, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1993, at 5B [hereinafter Candisky & 
Edwards, Pregnant Jane Does] (quoting Juvenile Court Judge Katherine Liss). 
142 Consider the fourteen-year-old pregnant minor, in foster care, who explained 
that she wanted an abortion in part because “her continued pregnancy and delivery of a child 
would affect her image with boys, who were bound to find out about it.” In re T.H., 484 
N.E.2d 568, 569–70 (Ind. 1985). T.H. further explained that “she wished to continue her 
education and make something of herself.” Id. The denial of her petition was upheld on 
appeal. Id. at 571. 
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among the young,143 and despite the fact that about one in three women in 
the United States will have had an abortion during their reproductive 
years,144 most are silent, if not secretive about it.145 Such reticence is 
understandable: a powerful combination of forces—visual, political, 
commercial—has made the fetus into a vivid, personable, and for some an 
heroic presence.146 Anyone who has sat in traffic knows that “Abortion 
Stops a Beating Heart” (bumper stickers) and the right thing to do is 
“Choose Life” (license plates).147 
These messages may work, and perhaps work too well. Some 
young women find the revelation of an unwanted pregnancy so daunting 
and the idea of an abortion so unthinkable that they hide their pregnancies 
and abandon or kill their newborns. Acknowledging the phenomenon, 
nearly every state has enacted an “infant safe havens” law authorizing 
desperate young mothers to leave their newborns anonymously at 
designated locations, such as emergency rooms and fire stations.148 Safe 
                                            
143 See Elizabeth Hayt, Surprise, Mom: I’m Against Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
30, 2003, at sec. 9 p. 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/30/style/surprise-
mom-i-m-against-abortion.html (reporting that in 2002, fifty-four percent of college 
freshmen favored legal abortion, compared to sixty-seven percent a decade earlier); Susan 
Dominus, The Mysterious Disappearance of Young Pro-Choice Women, GLAMOUR, Aug. 
2005, at 200–01 (reporting on the view that, because contraception is available, unwanted 
pregnancy is just carelessness and abortion therefore inexcusable). 
144 Guttmacher Inst., State Facts about Abortion: New York 2006, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/new_york.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) (concluding 
that, based on current abortion rates, “about one in three American women will have had an 
abortion by the time she reaches age 45.”). 
145 See Barbara Ehrenreich, Owning Up to Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at 
A21 (observing that while “abortion is legal—it’s just not supposed to be mentioned or 
acknowledged as an acceptable option”). See also Alice Clapman, Note, Privacy Rights and 
Abortion Outing: A Proposal for Using Common-Law Torts to Protect Abortion Patients and 
Staff, 112 YALE L.J. 1545 (2003). 
146 Sanger, Legislating in the Culture of Life, supra note 16, at 800–08, 821–28 
(describing the religious and political development of the “culture of life” and the use of fetal 
ultrasound imagery to establish the fetus as an immediate presence, respectively). 
147 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 641–44 (2008) (discussing the legality of states’ 
issuances of controversially themed license places); Peggy Hau, The Politics of Law, 
Language, & Morality: Thucydides & the Abortion Debate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 711, 
736 (1999) (discussing “Abortion Stops a Beating Heart” bumper stickers). 
148 See Sanger, Legislating in the Culture of Life, supra note 16, at 773 (“By 2005, 
only the Alaska, Vermont, and Nebraska legislatures had failed to pass Safe Haven laws.”). 
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haven laws are predicated on the incentive value of secrecy with regard to 
the resolution of an unwanted pregnancy. In contrast to the immobilized 
young women who are the targets of safe haven legislation, bypass 
petitioners have faced up to their situations, thought through their options, 
and have decided to take control of their lives within the bounds of the law. 
Their privacy is no less important to them than it is to others law has so 
elaborately sought to protect. 
C. Humiliation, Dread, and the Demands of Dignity 
As discussed earlier, my concern is less with the impact of bypass 
hearings on a minor’s access to abortion (however serious that may be) than 
with the harms wrought by virtue of participation in the process itself. 
Although most petitions are approved in the end, it is still important to give 
substantive content to what happens en route to the end. This section begins 
the inquiry into what is required of minors at the hearings and how they 
experience them, through the lens of dignitarian values. 
Again, it is important to stress the distinctly legal character of the 
bypass enterprise. The hearings are a form of legal process that take place in 
a place of law and carry the formal indicia of law—there is a courtroom, 
judge, testimony, counsel, and court reporter. Dignity has a special 
resonance in this setting. Michelman has expressed these values, in the 
context of a litigant’s access to a forum at all, as “reflecting concern for the 
humiliation or loss of self-respect which a person might suffer if denied an 
opportunity to litigate.”149 While minors are not exactly litigants, concerns 
about self-respect apply equally in the context of petitioning. 
In describing the workings of a trial, Robert Ferguson has observed 
that “[e]very trial is about an unhappiness that someone has been unable to 
stand, and every courtroom decision contains a mountain of misery for 
someone.”150 A judicial bypass hearing may be less formal than a trial but it 
is no less momentous. Ferguson’s phrase—a mountain of misery—captures 
well its unhappy character. 
1. Humiliation 
Bypass hearings humiliate the girls who must participate in them. 
This is not because most judges are mean or intentionally harsh, although 
some certainly interrogate rather than question and lecture rather than 
                                            
149 Michelman, supra note 27, at 1172. 
150 ROBERT FERGUSON, THE TRIAL IN AMERICAN LIFE 38 (2008). 
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assess. But the problem lies in the nature of the inquiry and not simply its 
manner. Bypass petitioners must testify before strangers regarding the most 
private matters in a teenager’s life: the fact of sexual intercourse, the 
predicament of pregnancy, and the structure or disarray of home life that 
make petitioners believe they can not involve their parents. Girls are asked 
about their views on motherhood, their personal relationships, and their 
success (or struggles) in life so far. Such revelations are intensely difficult 
for teenage girls, as they would be even for adults who, at least since the 
pre-Roe days of hospital abortion review, have been spared the public 
display of such private accounting.151 
Certainly, in the area of criminal law, care is taken to protect rape 
victims from having to testify unnecessarily about intimate issues. Under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, questions about the witness’s prior sexual 
history or sexual disposition are forbidden in criminal and in civil 
proceedings: “The rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the 
invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is 
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion 
of sexual innuendo into the fact-finding process.”152 In contrast, some 
bypass judges feel quite free to pose all manner of personal comments and 
questions to bypass petitioners. The state’s interest in respecting those who 
come into court as victims should attach to those who come in as rights 
bearers. 
In thinking about how the hearings work on teenagers, it is 
important to distinguish between embarrassment and humiliation. To reveal 
or confide the facts of a pregnancy to a sister, friend, or counselor might 
well be embarrassing. The sex, the pregnancy, or the relationship may have 
been a big mistake; one should have known better, been more careful or less 
trusting. But these same confidences register quite differently when their 
revelation is not a matter of private confession or counsel, but is instead 
compelled in court. These are the very subjects—sex, secrecy, mistakes—
that make talk so very interesting when it takes the form of gossip and is 
about someone else.153 
                                            
151 See generally Rickie Solinger, “A Complete Disaster”: Abortion and the 
Politics of Hospital Abortion Committees, 1950-1970, 19 FEMINIST STUD. 241 (1993) 
[hereinafter Solinger, A Complete Disaster] (describing the use of hospital abortion boards 
composed of obstetricians and psychiatrists to decide if an abortion was necessary “to 
preserve the life” of pregnant women seeking a legal abortion.). 
152 FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note. 
153 PATRICIA ANN MEYER SPACKS, GOSSIP 11 (1985). 
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Bypass testimony requires something like gossiping about oneself. 
That only the judge and a few others—bailiff, court reporter, attorney—are 
present does little to diminish the magnitude of the intrusion. Anonymity 
and confidentiality provisions may protect bypass petitioners from the 
wider public view, but that is not the only sense in which something may be 
made public. A judge, even in a closed courtroom, represents the state. 
Bypass hearings require girls to reveal personal matters before a powerful 
public official. For minors, this is not a private hearing but a recitation in 
front of an important authoritative adult. 
Moreover, humiliation does not necessarily dependent on the 
presence of an audience. Consider a corporal punishment case from the 
European Court of Human Rights, in which the Court had to decide whether 
the “birching” (three strokes with a cane) of a fifteen-year-old boy by the 
local constable was degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention 
on Human Rights, which protects “a person’s dignity and physical 
integrity.”154 The local authorities from the Isle of Man had argued that the 
birching was not degrading, in part because it took place in private and 
because the boy’s name was not published. In rejecting their argument, the 
Court observed: 
“Publicity may be a relevant factor in assessing whether a 
punishment is ‘degrading’ . . . but the Court does not consider 
that absence of publicity will necessarily prevent a given 
punishment from falling into that category: it may well suffice 
that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the 
eyes of others.”155 
Similarly, concern about the degrading treatment of detainees in 
Iraq and elsewhere has not depended on it being viewed by others. In some 
cases the debasement was displayed to others; in other cases it was not. 
Humiliation works because of how the treatment registers with the 
subjected person. Whatever the reasons may be for using humiliation in the 
interrogation setting, there is no proper account for its use on young women 
during a civil hearing. 
                                            
154 See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser A) ¶¶ 32–33 (1978). As 
the Court explained, “[t]he applicant was made to take down his trousers and underpants and 
bend over a table; he was held by two policemen whilst a third administered the punishment, 
pieces of the birch breaking at the first stroke. . . . The birching raised, but did not cut, the 
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155 Id. ¶ 32 (emphasis added). 
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2. Terror and Testimony 
Courtrooms and courthouses are often intimidating settings, even 
for adults and even for litigants not testifying about unwanted pregnancy. 
Testimony by judges who hear bypass cases, by advocates who accompany 
petitioners, and by minors themselves make absolutely clear that the 
experience is one of anxiety and dread. A Minnesota judge described the 
level of apprehension of petitioners as worse than that of women seeking 
orders of protection for domestic violence.156 A study of twenty-six 
Massachusetts minors whose petitions were all granted revealed a near 
universal fear that they would say something wrong and their petitions 
would be denied; this in a state where nearly all petitions are successful.157 
Lawyers who represent minors are aware of their distress and are hesitant to 
leave them alone in courthouse hallways.158 
Even before the law steps in, these young women are unmarried, 
pregnant, and facing a profound set of decisions about the course their lives 
will take. In some respects, they are not unlike pregnant women: both 
groups must consider and weigh existing obligations and aspirations against 
those of motherhood. Of course, adult women who decide to end a 
pregnancy do not have to deliberate about the reasons for their decision out 
loud in court. They do not have testify about the circumstances of 
intercourse, their mishaps with contraception, misgivings about pregnancy, 
or the nature of their relationships with those closest to them. 
These are exactly the areas of inquiry pursued by courts in their 
attempts to assess the maturity of bypass petitioners. In response to 
questions from judges or from their own attorneys, young women have had 
to explain that they were impregnated by their own fathers,159 had a prior 
abortion,160 had intercourse with more than one man,161 and experienced 
                                            
156 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766 (D. Minn. 1986), rev’d, 853 F.2d 
1452 (8th Cir. 1988). 
157 J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to 
Teens who Make the Abortion Decision without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 61 (2003). 
158 NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 59, at 2. 
159 In re Anonymous, 678 So. 2d 783, 784 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (Fourteen-year-
old petitioner testified that “her pregnancy resulted from sexual abuse practiced upon her by 
her father.”). 
160See In re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 1181 (Ohio 1990) (petition denied). 
161 Id. 
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family violence (against them or against their mothers).162 Girls have 
testified about depression and self-cutting following the death of a mother 
(displaying the scars to the court),163 broken condoms,164 discord between 
parents, and parental opposition to the prospect of an interracial child.165 
The concern here is not whether these facts were accepted as 
grounds for maturity but rather that they had to be given at all. As the 
appellate record reveals, invasive lines of inquiry are accepted as valid 
routes to assessing maturity and best interests. Questions about home life, 
religious values, or attitudes about adoption may not be asked in every case, 
but, when they are, the resulting testimony is often disturbing. A 
grandmother pleads with the court to approve the petition on account of her 
granddaughter’s depression.166 As an experienced Texas bypass attorney 
explained: 
These cases are hard on everyone. . . . You must ask a 17-year 
old why her family is dysfunctional. Odds are her boyfriend 
dumped her when he found out she was pregnant, and she is 
having the biggest crisis of her life. Now she has to go to court 
and tell a bunch of strangers about it. It’s heartbreaking stuff.167 
Judges are sometimes disdainful and harsh. A thirteen-year-old is 
mocked for having no job other than “detasseling corn.”168 More recently, a 
judge turned down a petition stating: “[T]he legislature, in its infinite 
wisdom, has determined that an unborn child who never has had even the 
                                            
162 See In re Doe 3, 645 N.E.2d 134, 134–35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (denial reversed 
on appeal); In re Anonymous, 711 So.2d 475, 475 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). 
163 In re A.W., 826 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Miss. 2002). 
164 In re Jane Doe, No. 02CA0067, 2002 WL 31492302, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 
16, 2002); In re Doe, 973 So.2d 548, 550 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008) (minor testified she was 
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165 In re Jane Doe, 2002 WL 31492302, at *2. 
166 In re A.W., 826 So.2d at 1282. 
167 Mark Donald, Dissent over Consent, TEX. LAW., Mar. 7, 2005, 
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168 In re Anonymous I, 558 N.W.2d. 784, 786 (Neb. 1997) (per curiam). 
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ability to do any wrong, could be put to death so that his mother can play 
[sports].”169 
We should not lose sight of the consequences of judicial 
disapproval on minors. Girls whose petitions are denied understand that 
they have not been believed, despite their sworn testimony, and the 
appellate cases reveal a pervasive dismissiveness of minors’ reasons for not 
telling their parents. Minors’ concerns about being beaten170 or thrown out 
of the house (as was the petitioner’s older sister when she got pregnant)171 
or about parental well–being (a depressed mother172 or a violent stepfather 
who threatened the mother)173 are discounted as mere excuses for not 
wanting to be in trouble. Of course minors do not want to get in trouble, and 
some may overestimate the severity of parental reaction. On the other hand, 
minors are likely to have it exactly right. They may uniquely understand the 
demands of their family’s interests (parents, stepparents, siblings) and their 
role in family caretaking and be able to gauge the emotional fall-out of an 
abortion on their families. Moreover, other facts can be arrayed against the 
judicial hypothesis that minors are exaggerating certain fears—for example, 
the potential for domestic violence among adult women required to notify 
their husbands about an abortion.174 The same dynamic would seem to 
apply with even greater force in the case of minors obliged to notify 
parents. 
Having one’s petition denied means that the minor has been 
officially declared incapable of assessing her own circumstances and needs 
in a court of law. The impact of this should not be underestimated. Robert 
Ferguson has noted that judges—or the “judicial figure”—enjoy 
                                            
169 In re Anonymous, 905 So.2d 845, 850 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quoting the trial 
judge). 
170 In re Doe, 645 N.E.2d 134, 134–35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).  
171 See generally In re Anonymous, 964 So.2d 1239 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); In re 
Anonymous, 718 So.2d 64 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). 
172 In re Anonymous II, 570 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Neb. 1997). 
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134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
174 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891–94 (1992) 
(discussing “justifiable fears of physical abuse” that spousal notification laws may cause).  
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unprecedented authority in a democracy: “[We] set judges apart.”175 To be 
judged in court is a profound moment and hits hard, though on occasion, a 
ruling may exalt; one Texas attorney emphasizes to her clients in successful 
bypass cases that being designated a mature person in a court of law is 
something one can be very proud of.176 
3. Dignity 
Is it fair or appropriate to require that a minor undergo an ordeal by 
process as the price of deciding to end a pregnancy? Put another way, are 
there limits to what a pregnant girl should have to do as part of exercising 
her rights under Roe? Some may insist that the intimate information 
squeezed out of minors is necessary to evaluate their maturity, or that it 
isn’t really all that humiliating. No doubt teenagers experience some things 
as humiliating which may not be so from an objective point of view: 
consider the mere presence (or existence) of parents. 
But the situations we are considering are surely humiliating for 
young girls if anything is. Bypass hearings concern matters that are not only 
private but perhaps disturbing, involving secrets about their bodies, their 
relationships, their religious beliefs, and how all of these map on to 
aspirations, whether imagined or concrete, for the future. A Florida judge 
denied a petition in part because, when asked if her decision had been 
difficult, the minor simply answered “yes.”177 The appellate court affirmed, 
noting that “[t]he record before the trial judge fails . . . to advise the trial 
court of the depth or duration of her deliberative process.”178 But 
deliberation is exactly the aspect of abortion decision-making that ought to 
be protected. The decision encompasses a range of deeply personal, often 
self-defining preferences and commitments and these should not be on 
inspection. 
Some might argue that while dignity is the proper measure for the 
treatment of adults before the law, its application is less necessary when 
applied to minors. They are, after all, still unformed and still subject to the 
control and discipline of others. They are not quite ready but only “destined 
for dignity.” Perhaps a little discipline in the form of a bypass hearing might 
                                            
175 FERGUSON, supra note 150, at 30–31. 
176 Interview with Rita Lucido, Family Law Attorney (Dec. 30, 2008) (on file with 
author). 
177 In re Doe, 973 So.2d 548, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
178 Id. (emphasis added). 
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have a useful educational function. Certainly parents may chide, punish, 
and even humiliate their children almost as they see fit. 
But judges stand in a different relation to children than do parents. 
Judges are representatives of the state, and minors are not the subjects of 
their parental custody. Some judges, however well intentioned, seem to 
have gotten confused on the point. As a Florida trial court judge stated to 
one young woman after denying her petition: 
Miss, I know this seems like the most terrible thing in the world. 
And, I will tell you, as I indicated, a father of two daughters, and 
I want you to know that I am Catholic. And, I have always told 
my daughters, whatever it is, you can discuss it with me. And at a 
certain point, I will also tell you, that I have always told them, 
regardless of what I might think, if something happened to you, 
that would be your decision and whatever decision you make, I 
will support you. 
I’m not telling you that you can or cannot terminate that 
pregnancy. I just think, in your best interest, where you are going 
to have to go through with it with your parents, it would be best 
for you to notify your parents. And, I am sure they love you.179 
Another judge stated: “Let me just say, I’m very concerned about 
this young lady’s welfare. Like counsel, I’m a mother.”180 This confusion of 
roles is particularly problematic in a hearing that is an express alternative to 
parental involvement. Bypass petitioners are citizens as well as children, 
however incomplete their citizenship may be. 
The law has rejected subjecting children to forms of humiliation on 
constitutional grounds in other circumstances. In Safford Unified School 
District v. Redding, the Supreme Court considered the search of an eighth 
grader by school officials who had been looking for over-the-counter 
painkillers.181 Informed by another student that 13 year old Savana Redding 
had the contraband in her notebook, the vice-principal searched the 
notebook. When no pills were found, he directed the school nurse and a 
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woman assistant to have Redding “remove her clothes down to her 
underwear, and then ‘pull out’ her bra and the elastic band on her 
underpants.”182 Redding challenged the search as unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. In its decision, the Court found that the school officials 
had immunity, but it agreed with Redding about the search itself. Because 
there had been no reason to suspect that the pills were in Redding’s 
undergarments (as opposed to in her notebook), a search that “necessarily 
exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree” was impermissible. 183 
In finding the examination of Redding’s body had been 
“excessively intrusive,” the Court applied the established school-search 
standard requiring officials to take account of “the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction.”184 It concluded this thirteen year 
old girl’s “subjective expectation of privacy against such a search was 
inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and 
humiliating.”185 The Court contextualized the nature as well as the 
mechanics of the search. Unlike getting undressed for a gym class, 
“exposing for a search is responding to an accusation reserved for suspected 
wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a number of 
communities . . . have banned [strip searches in schools] no matter what the 
facts may be.”186 
Bypass petitioners are not subject to body searches but instead to 
questions about their bodies. What they are asked to talk about—an actual 
pregnancy, sexual relations, the details of the abortion procedure—is not a 
physical examination, but in some ways it comes close. While many bypass 
petitioners are sixteen and seventeen, some, like Redding, are only thirteen; 
responding to such questions might reasonably and subjectively be 
experienced as humiliating at any age. Like the search of Redding’s 
underpants, bypass questioning takes place in an official formal site—a 
courtroom instead of the principal’s office—and similarly is conducted by 
formidable adults. Despite the absence of a legal infraction, the aura of 
accusation hangs over bypass hearings. 
Of course, what is missing in the bypass context is a search as 
defined for Fourth Amendment purposes. Nonetheless, the Redding case is 
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helpful in thinking about what constitutes the respectful treatment of young 
people required to interact with the state even in a civil setting. As the 
Supreme Court concluded in Redding, “[t]he meaning of such a search, and 
the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive 
in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”187 As a 
distinct form of legal hearing, bypass hearings are also in a category of their 
own. What other forum requires the revelation of such intimate deliberation 
as a prerequisite for exercising a constitutional right? 
Consider also the school cases in which minors have resisted 
saluting or praying in school on First Amendment grounds. In response to 
such complaints, school boards offered an opt-out provision: students who 
did not wish to pray or salute could leave the room, or otherwise 
demonstrably decline to participate. Yet the Supreme Court rejected this 
response in part because of the subjective costs to the students of opting out. 
As the Court stated in Lee v. Weisman, in which students could decline to 
participate in prayer during their high school graduation ceremony, 
[t]he undeniable fact is that the school district’s supervision and 
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public 
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand 
as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the 
invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and 
indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.188 
Weighing the experiential costs to students, the Court found that opt-out 
provisions were themselves a source of coercion. 
The analogy here is a modest one; I simply note another context in 
which the law has paid attention to the dignitary interests of minors by 
taking seriously the concrete circumstances under which they are permitted 
to exercise their rights. The Court in Lee acknowledged that “[r]esearch in 
psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often 
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the 
influence is strongest in matters of social convention.”189 While bypass 
hearings do not involve peer pressure, they do involve circumstantial 
pressure: the solemnity and unfamiliarity of the courthouse, court 
personnel, and language of law. Minors who have undergone bypass 
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hearings have found the hearings to be the most difficult and intimidating 
part of the entire abortion experience.190 Whether, in Casey’s terms, this is a 
“purpose” or simply an “effect,” it is unquestionably a consequence, and 
one that implicates dignitarian interests. 
4. The Indignity of Exclusion 
Minors’ dignity is implicated by still another aspect of the bypass 
process. This is the practice of some judges not to hear—let alone rule on—
bypass petitions at all. Some judges formally recuse themselves;191 others 
simply have their clerks turn back petitions (“We don’t do that in this 
county”).192 In one urban jurisdiction, only three judges out of pool of sixty 
hear bypass cases;193 in another, lawyers have experienced “up to five 
recusals [from a single case] before it lands on someone who will take it.”194 
In such cases, minors and their advocates may wait for another judge to take 
the calendar on another day, or they may travel to another county to file the 
petition and be heard.195 
The practice has been effective; counties where judges shun cases 
record few if any bypass petitions. Because pregnant young women have 
little time to waste, they tend to file in counties where they have a chance to 
be heard, and where there also may be a medical clinic in case they prevail. 
In Ohio, for example, girls from all around the state tend to file in 
Cleveland, Akron, or Youngstown.196 They do not file in Geauga County, 
where over a two year period no bypass cases were filed. When asked why 
no petitions had been filed in Geauga Country for two years, the education 
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chairman of the Geauga County Right to Life answered that “[m]aybe it’s 
because it’s more of a Christian place. We don’t have any abortionaries 
here. We don’t have any killing centers. And a lot of girls who are going to 
kill their babies don’t want anyone to see them.”197 But although refusing to 
hear cases may deter teen petitions, it does not wholly prevent teen 
abortions. Public health records reveal that eighteen minors from Geauga 
County had abortions over the same two year period.198 The cost of 
obtaining the abortion has simply been made dearer. 
This informal system of forum deprivation is deeply problematic, 
and I discuss its impact on law’s legitimacy below. Here, however, I want 
simply to expose its dignitarian consequences, as young women scramble to 
find a court where they can be heard. Most women, even young ones, have 
a pretty good sense of abortion’s disfavored status under the law. They may 
not have the vocabulary of “hyperregulation” but they know there is 
something suspect about a medical procedure treated so differently from all 
others. Denying young women a legal forum takes things up a notch. Forum 
exclusion tells them that their claim falls below the requirements of justice 
and that the problem of how to gain access to the courts is theirs alone to 
solve. This is more than an inconvenience. It is an affront to the status and 
self-worth that participation in legal process bestows and it should be 
recognized as such. 
Tucked into dignitarian concerns are two other closely related 
concerns: participation and effectuation values. Identified by Frank 
Michelman in the context of due process decisions regarding litigation 
access,199 each of these implicates the dignity of bypass petitioners. 
Participation values reflect “an appreciation of litigation as one of the 
modes in which persons exert influence, or have their wills ‘counted,’ in 
societal decisions they care about.”200 The expressed will of bypass 
petitioners can only be counted through the operation of the hearing offered 
as a constitutional substitute for the decisional authority established in Roe. 
In the bypass context, participation lies cheek by jowl with what Michelman 
has called the effectuation value, which “see[s] litigation as an important 
means through which persons are entitled to get, or are given assurance of 
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having, whatever we are pleased to regard as rightfully theirs.”201 Bypass 
hearings are not only an important means, they are the only legal means by 
which a pregnant minor can proceed, at least in thirty four states. Perhaps 
the problem is that “we,” or at least a good number of us, are not pleased to 
regard an abortion decision as rightfully theirs. On this account, denying 
minors the chance to effectuate their decision may, at a practical level, seem 
more like local justice than an indignity. 
IV. COMPELLING NARRATIVE 
What is the significance of using a judicial hearing as the means of 
supervising teenage abortion? To explore the question, this Part looks at 
other hearings in which the content and tone of a petitioner’s plea is crucial 
to the outcome. One distant but intriguing example of what I have in mind 
is found in Natalie Zemon Davis’s study of sixteenth-century French letters 
of remission, or “pardon tales.”202 It is helpful at times to stand back from 
the preoccupation with particular concerns and look at other forums of 
supplication: their operation, their structures, and the uses to which they 
were put. I look as well at a few examples closer to home and suggest 
parallels between bypass hearings and modern American parole hearings 
and defendant allocutions. As with other analogies, my aim is to illustrate 
and to help articulate misgivings which we feel almost instinctively about 
the bypass process. 
In looking at hearings across continents and centuries, I consider 
hearings as a genre or type of legal proceeding and so draw on insights from 
genre theory. As Alistair Fowler has explained, genres operate by means of 
“shared but more or less unconscious and unformulated grammatical 
rules.”203 “Every genre has a unique repertoire, from which its 
representatives select characteristics”; some are matters of form and some 
are substantive.204 In literary genres such as the novel, these include such 
features as length, setting, character types, character names, and so on. 
Similar features, some matters of form or procedure and some substantive, 
also cast light on how the bypass hearing, as a type of legal process, 
conveys meaning both to its participants and to a wider social audience. 
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Thinking about hearings as a genre is something of a challenge in 
that the concept of a hearing includes such a wide range of legal events. In 
general, a “hearing” is a non-technical term used to describe an occasion 
when a person presents argument or evidence before an official legal officer 
in a situation short of a trial.205 Even this general description produces a set 
of characteristics, such as a degree of informality, as a feature of the 
process. Hearings also involve some form of request or plea made before 
and resolved by a legal authority. It is important to keep these general 
features—informality, plea, decision-maker, resolution—in mind as they 
combine with the distinctive aspects of bypass hearings. These include the 
petitioner’s anonymity, her minority, the origins of her plea in a right, and 
the highly politicized nature of the hearing’s content—a decision about 
abortion. 
A. Pardon Tales 
Because much about the structure and purposes of French pardon 
tales parallels aspects of modern bypass hearings, I discuss the tales in some 
detail. Pardon tales or letters of remission were pleas by wrongdoers, 
mostly men, who had committed capital offenses and wished to ask for the 
king’s mercy.206 The requests took the form of letters written to the king in 
which the supplicants sought to explain what had happened and why they 
should be forgiven. Written in the third person, the letters attempted “to 
make sense of the unexpected and build coherence” by showing that their 
wrongful behavior had resulted from unusual circumstances and was 
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therefore both understandable and uncharacteristic.207 For example, letters 
would often locate the killing within festive days, when the excitement of 
wine and dancing and resulting jealousies and quarrels might explain the 
how the crime came about.208 Letters succeeded through the supplicant’s 
ability to present a persuasive tale about why he should be pardoned. As 
Davis notes, they showed “narrative skills at work in realistic and self-
interested persuasion.”209 
How did the ordinary wrong-doer bring this about? Pardon tales 
came not only from knights and gentlemen, but also from “the lips of lower 
orders.”210 How were regular folk able to craft a sufficiently persuasive 
tale? The answer is in part that the letters were collaborations between 
supplicants, royal notaries, and on occasion, lawyers. After hearing the 
supplicant’s story, the notaries would write up a draft, often embellishing it 
in order to present the supplicant as more sympathetic or more well-
connected.211 For those who could afford it, lawyers would then fine-tune 
the letter to make sure that the story met the demands of lawful excuse; for 
example, by clarifying that the murder weapon had not been specially 
procured for the act.212 
Yet despite this collaborative construction, the primary voice in the 
pardon tale was the supplicant’s, and for two quite sensible reasons. The 
first concerned the very nature of royal pardon seeking: the letter was 
understood as “a personal exchange, a subject’s voice speaking to the king 
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and the merciful king responding.”213 Second were the realities of truth 
telling. A story that was faithful to the supplicant’s own speech and 
memory was more likely to stand if later challenged by witnesses. Thus, 
although the letters may have resulted from “an exchange among several 
people about events, points of law, and chancellery style,”214 Davis 
concludes that they “can still be analyzed in terms of the life and values of 
the person seeking to save his neck by a story.”215 
Supplicants were up to the task because even “the unlearned among 
them did not come to their request for pardon innocent of storytelling 
skills.”216 Indeed, Davis observes that information about successful pardon 
seeking was widely available, “as necessary to villagers as information 
about dowry customs was to any wife.”217 Supplicants often showed up at 
the notary’s office “with a story in mind and, in the case of a literate person, 
perhaps with a draft.”218 They understood the “literary strategies” of a good 
pardon tale—what had to be said and how.219 Thus the avenged grievance 
must have been unexpected, the supplicant’s anger appropriate to his 
station, and his regret obvious.220 Details were concrete, sometimes chatty, 
so that the tale became a snapshot of an ordinary life gone suddenly awry. 
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B. Bypass Hearings and the Constraints of Genre 
As stylized forms of a plea, pardon tales and bypass procedures 
have much in common. From a structural point of view, the letters are, as 
Davis notes, a “mixed genre: a judicial supplication to persuade the king 
and courts, a historical account of one’s past actions, and a story.”221 Bypass 
narratives similarly seek to persuade by accounting for past actions. Minors 
must organize the circumstances of their predicament and their desire to 
abort into a compelling, convincing narrative. Because the hearings are a 
live colloquy between petitioner, lawyer, and judge, the minor’s 
presentation is likely to be less polished than the written pardon tale. This 
immediacy puts increased pressure on the hearing and on whatever limited 
preparation between a petitioner and her attorney precedes it.222 
Nonetheless, the task of both the pardon tale and the bypass testimony is 
similar: to establish a picture of someone worthy of the court’s favor, an 
ordinary person seeking extraordinary relief on the strength of the 
presentation. 
To do this in the bypass context, the petitioner must situate herself 
as having acted out of character in the events leading up to the hearing. This 
is part of the vocabulary of the genre. The sixteenth century supplicant 
could invoke a standard set of conventions—the passions of festival time 
and so on—to explain why he had acted hotheadedly. In some respects, the 
modern minor has a more difficult challenge: she must explain how a girl 
who stands before the court pregnant and unmarried is mature enough to 
decide about abortion, an act that for some judges is worse than what she 
has already done. The best she can do is to rely on a set of familiar teenage 
conventions to prove her upstanding character: the part-time job, good 
grades, activities in school, plans for college. Note that the minor must also 
argue in a delicate alternative: first that she is mature enough to make the 
decision, but in case that fails, that she is too hapless to take on the 
responsibilities of motherhood and it is therefore in her best interest to have 
an abortion.223 
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Her performative task is made the harder, however, by two distinct 
aspects of the hearings. The first concerns the relation between the manner 
in which petitioners testify and the court’s assessment of their maturity. The 
second concerns the problematic position of the minor. From the very start 
of the bypass process, certain structural features make her appear an 
unreliable witness, an unreliable girl. 
1. Manner and Maturity 
In deciding whether or not a minor is mature, trial judges are 
entitled to “draw inferences from the minor’s composure, analytic ability, 
appearance, thoughtfulness, tone of voice, expressions, and her ability to 
articulate her reasoning and conclusions.”224 Yet a lack of composure 
should not be surprising in the bypass context. As a Minnesota judge 
observed, “[y]ou see all the typical things that you would see with 
somebody under incredible amounts of stress, answering monosyllabically, 
tone of voice, tenor of voice, shaky, wringing of hands, you know, one 
young lady had her—her hands were turning blue and it was warm in my 
office.”225 
Stammering and other inadequacies of speech such as slang or 
blurting have counted against petitioners and been accepted as proof of 
immaturity. For example, when asked if she understood the risks involved 
in abortion, a thirteen-year-old petitioner answered, “Well, I hear you have 
bad cramps or you may get something up inside you that could cause risks”; 
when asked about childbirth, she replied that she “wouldn’t be able to go 
through with that.”226 The court concluded that the minor was “unable to 
communicate . . . a sufficient understanding of the medical procedure 
involved, the associated risks, or of the alternatives to abortion.”227 Yet even 
petitions from highly articulate minors have been denied. An Alabama 
minor answered similar questions about risks by stating: 
You could have an infection if you don’t take care of yourself 
afterwards. Sterilization if the instruments they use are not 
properly cleaned. You could have bleeding because you bleed 
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after you’ve had the abortion. You could have—what was the 
other one they told me—death, the main one, I guess. But they 
said that’s always a factor.228 
She too was found to be immature and insufficiently informed because she 
had not spoken personally to the physician who was to perform the 
abortion.229 
The fact is that bypass petitioners are teenagers and many of them 
talk like teenagers. In presenting her reasons for seeking an abortion, a 
Texas petitioner explained: 
[I]f I really put my cards on the table and look through them, I—I 
having a baby right now would probably stop 75 percent of what 
I want to do . . . . I know—I’m—like I said, I’m very busy. I have 
a lot of high goals, and having a baby would stop me from having 
them.230 
Of course “pretty busy” isn’t the best way to express why you would rather 
finish your education than have a baby and perhaps stammering sounds 
tentative. On another reading, however, the testimony seems honest and 
natural. Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s 
ruling that “a minor who was reluctant to carry her child to term because, at 
least in part, she was ‘pretty busy’ was not mature enough to make the 
[abortion] decision without parental guidance.”231 
In some instances the minor’s discomfort and its consequences for 
the quality of her testimony is intensified by the conduct of the judge 
himself. In a recent Florida case, the judge told the petitioner before 
denying the petition that: 
You know your mother and father, especially your mother, are 
going to know that you are pregnant. And if she sees you, she 
will know. Major things happen to your body when you get 
pregnant, even if you have an abortion.232 
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Although the denial was upheld on appeal, a dissenting judge 
observed that “the [trial] judge’s improper and openly argumentative 
personal assertions likely would have intimidated most adults—indeed, 
most attorneys. It is not difficult to imagine the chilling effect that his 
behavior had on this young woman’s ability to elaborate on her 
situation.”233 
There has also been a contrary complaint about the manner of 
minors’ testimony. This is not that the testimony is too casual but that it is 
too rehearsed. In an Alabama case, the petition was denied in part because 
the minor’s answers “appeared to be [given] in an almost rehearsed manner 
. . . [without] any expression of emotion.”234 Upheld on appeal, a dissenting 
justice stated that “I cannot believe that the fact that the testimony of a party 
has been rehearsed indicates that the testimony is a lie . . . . Preparing a 
party for trial is not suborning perjury.”235 But there are all sorts of ways to 
call a girl out. An Ohio minor testified that she was both planning to start 
using birth control and that she was not going to have sex again; her petition 
was denied in part on grounds of internal inconsistency.236 Well, maybe, but 
it is not so hard to see how such contradictions come about when aspiration, 
reality, and the flustered desire to give the right answer come together in 
court. 
2. The Structure of Stealth 
A minor’s presentation of herself as a worthy object of the judicial 
favor is further complicated, if not compromised, by the very nature of the 
bypass process. The very name of a bypass hearing suggests an end run 
around something, and explains why some advocates prefer to call the 
hearings “waivers.”237 There is also an uneasy fit between the procedural 
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requirement of anonymity and the appearance of furtiveness produced by 
aspects of the requirement that cuts against the task at hand. Consider the 
many ways in which she appears untrustworthy and sneaky. By virtue of 
her petition, the court knows she has had sex and is a girl “in trouble.” She 
has literally snuck into court in order not to be seen, and she uses an alias or 
initials in order not to be known.238 In the eyes of many, she is sneaking 
around the traditional laws of parental control; in the eyes of others, by 
seeking an abortion, she is trying to sneak around the very wages of sin.239 
To the extent the sixteenth century pardon-seeker could show that his 
wrongful conduct was a one-off, the bypass petitioner’s dissolute ways 
seem on-going. 
Although these aspects of the hearing may cast bypass petitioners 
as “bad girls,” there is some irony here, for these are not the kids who 
typically turn up in court for misconduct. These are girls who have planned 
futures for themselves and believe that motherhood, at this stage of their 
lives, will take them off course. As one Ohio judge commented, “[t]he 
common denominator is that they are intelligent and have a lot on the 
ball.”240 But for their pregnancies and their desire to abort, these are the 
“good girls.” 
3. Gender and Narrative Demand 
The concept of “good girls” raises an important distinction between 
bypass hearings and pardon tales: the role of gender in making one’s case. 
As Davis points out, few pardon seekers in sixteenth century France were 
women, their absence explained in part by the narrative demands of the 
plea.241 Women who killed were “removed by cultural assumptions . . . 
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from the acceptable legal excuses of impulse.”242 They were less able to 
depend on “ritual or festive settings to give workable coherence to their 
remission narratives” and generally had a much smaller range of 
explanatory settings that might have caused and could excuse their anger.243 
Crucial narrative elements of a successful pardon tale—cavorting in public, 
the unexpected insult, sudden anger, and subsequent remorse—were not 
available to them. Only killing to protect one’s sexual honor was an 
acceptable ground for seeking mercy, and in such cases women situated 
their stories within familiar household scenes, such as preparing meals.244 
Moreover, as Davis explains, because subjection was an everyday feature of 
women’s lives, “being on their knees in humble supplication” was a less 
impressive gesture than when displayed by a man.245 
The absence of women pardon seekers was also a function of 
substantive law. The capital crimes most associated with women, witchcraft 
and infanticide, were simply not pardonable.246 By the sixteenth century, the 
death of an unbaptized infant following a concealed pregnancy was 
evidence of sexual sin punishable by death.247 Both family morality and 
royal majesty were better served by giving such a woman the justice she 
deserved; some acts were “too wicked for king’s pardon.”248 
Of course, in contrast to French pardon seekers, all bypass 
petitioners are women. Yet the same problems that vexed women 
supplicants centuries ago are at work in the present setting: how to position 
oneself as worthy of judicial sympathy when the underlying act was sexual, 
secret, and sometimes consensual? How to make the error of one’s ways 
aberrational when the hearing itself underscores ongoing stealth? And 
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finally, how to overcome the view in the eyes of some judges that despite 
its legality, abortion and infanticide are one and the same and that each is 
too wicked for the king’s pardon? 
C. The Expression of Remorse 
Although bypass hearings are organized around the court’s 
determination about maturity, conveying a sense of remorse has in some 
instances become entwined in the process. Remorse has been understood as 
an aspect of rehabilitation and that, in turn, is a sign of maturity. The person 
is on the right path because the old one has been renounced. Depending on 
the judge, the successful petitioner’s story will therefore include not only 
reports about grade point average and after-school jobs but also a 
satisfactory explanation as to why, despite rejecting her parents, adoption, 
and, by some lights, her fetus, the minor deserves to have her petition 
granted. This requires an appropriate shading of the tale, one that not only 
establishes maturity but gestures toward contrition for the mess she has 
gotten herself into and from which she now asks the court’s help to escape. 
This packaging of the story—in a sense this packaging of the self—
creates harm of a quality that law has a unique power to bring about. The 
bypass petitioner swears to tell the truth but she also understands that 
something more (or less) is required. Like a defendant before a sentencing 
judge or an inmate before a parole board, she must present a version of 
herself that matches a set of expectations about what a remorseful 
defendant, a reformed parolee, or a contrite pregnant teenager looks like. In 
the case of sentencing or parole, guilt will have been established by the 
verdict, yet it has been crucial to the plea for a lesser sentence or early 
release that the defendants accept responsibility for their actions 
themselves.249 As a popular jailhouse manual tells parolees, “[board] 
members will consider why the crime happened, whether you feel any 
remorse for the crime, and what you would do differently in the future.”250 
This is accomplished both by reciting the words and displaying the 
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appearance of a remorseful person.251 Allocution before sentencing works 
much the same way. The Third Circuit has described it as: 
[T]he opportunity [for the court] to evaluate the total person who 
stands at the bar of justice: to note the physical appearance and 
demeanor; the tone, temper and rhythm of speech; the facial 
expressions, the hands, the revealing look into the eyes. In sum, 
[the absence of allocution] deprives the judge of those 
impressions gleaned through the senses in any personal 
confrontation in which one attempts to assess the credibility or to 
evaluate the true moral fiber of another.252 
There are several problems with requiring remorse as a condition to 
leniency in the criminal context. There is concern that this may violate a 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.253 There is also the 
problem of defendants who, despite conviction, are innocent and therefore 
have nothing to repent. (This was the case with the four young men 
convicted in the “Central Park jogger” case.)254 Moreover, even a 
remorseful defendant or parolee may be bad at performing remorse and is 
therefore demonstrably unconvincing. This may be a particular problem 
with juvenile defendants, who for developmental and social reasons may 
fail to display sufficient remorse and who have in consequence been 
removed from juvenile court to stand trial as an adult.255 
My concern is less a bypass petitioner’s inability to show remorse 
or contrition than whether the display should be required in the first place. 
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Bypass hearings are supposed to be about a minor’s maturity, not her 
attitude. Yet advocates who represent minors are often aware that some 
judges want to hear some indication that she is sorry (whether for the 
pregnancy or the abortion isn’t always clear), that this situation won’t 
happen again (and some proof to back it up), and that she considers abortion 
to have moral implications that she has taken seriously.256 Because the very 
structure of the bypass hearing situates minors as suspect, the expression of 
display or remorse is tricky. Talking to clergy or otherwise reflecting on 
one’s religion as part of the decision-making process is sometimes regarded 
as an indication of moral responsibility, and some advocates urge their 
clients to consider doing so before the hearing.257 Looking at the ultrasound 
images of one’s fetus has also been taken as evidence that the minor took 
her decision seriously.258 But the minor’s “appreciation of the moral and 
religious dilemma presented by her decision” is a factor that courts have 
taken into consideration in a maturity determination.259 
This is not to say that all questions pertaining to responsibility are 
improper. A measure of maturity might reasonably include a plan for 
contraception in the future so that the judge is more confident that the 
young woman will not again return to court for this reason. (Petitions have 
been denied where it was a minor’s second pregnancy.)260 Some advocates 
therefore prepare their clients for questioning on their current birth control 
practices, explaining its relevance to the client.261 
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There should be concern, however, when the law requires anyone to 
offer up a particular presentation of self or sentiment as a prerequisite to 
exercising a right. The practice is particularly objectionable in the fraught 
circumstances of a bypass hearing. As we have seen in the criminal context, 
much is at stake if the defendant is unconvincing or unwilling to show 
remorse. In seventeenth-century England, the condemned were expected to 
give a repentance speech from the gallows, broadcasting their acceptance of 
guilt and hope for redemption.262 These were practices of criminal justice 
centuries ago. But pregnant girls should not have to assume a (moral) 
position or play a set piece in a contrived morality play when choosing to 
end a pregnancy. 
My argument is not that the bypass system would be improved if 
only minors were encouraged to tell their own stories. The heart of the 
problem is less a matter of testimonial authenticity than that minors are 
required to tell stories in court at all. I recognize that this goes counter to 
advocates’ insights regarding the importance of a client’s “voice.”263 In her 
influential reflection on representing a welfare client at an administrative 
hearing for fraud, Lucie White analyzed how the hearing worked to shape 
Mrs. G’s testimony into what White calls “subordinated speech.”264 The 
hearing was marked by intimidation (there was much to lose) and a kind of 
built-in humiliation (the client came into the process as a cheat). Each of 
these is familiar in the bypass setting. 
To be sure, there are some impressive counterexamples of litigants 
who refuse subordination. Catherine Connolly has written about the 
“steadfast refusal” of certain lesbian clients to conform to society’s 
expectations of family, even in the high-stakes context of a second-parent 
adoption.265 This is all to the good, but we should keep in mind that these 
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were sophisticated, powerful adult litigants who had strategized about when 
and where to bring their actions. Connolly explains that her clients had 
chosen “to use the law only when they felt the time was ripe for them and 
their children.”266 In contrast, bypass petitioners rarely appear in the peak of 
confidence. Certainly many must scramble to find a court in which to be 
heard at all, and few have any ability to “pick their moment,” since time, 
not timing, is crucial to them. Many lawyers do their best to secure 
respectful treatment for their bypass clients, but teenage abortion is not the 
right place to work on improving the integrity of client narrative. The 
courthouse is the wrong forum for pregnant minors to work out anything. 
What they have to say may be compelling, but it should not be compelled. 
V. PURPOSE AND PUNISHMENT 
Let us return for a moment to sixteenth-century France. It appears 
that by the middle of that century almost all letters of remission brought 
before the king were ratified.267 This led to concerns that pardons were 
being granted too easily and granted to the well-connected rather than the 
deserving. Yet, despite such misgivings, the practice continued because in 
addition to pardoning wrongdoers, it also served important functions of 
state.268 Remember that receiving a pardon required playing by the king’s 
rules. This meant presenting oneself as someone who had only momentarily 
lost control of an otherwise upstanding life. It is here that the demands of 
narrative worked smoothly with objectives of state building: 
The habit of language insisted upon in the letters of remission and 
the roles in which supplicants were required to present 
themselves were among the civilizing mechanisms of the early 
modern French state, reminding people subjectively of the locus 
of power. . . .269 
The fact that pardons were so generously granted led to their “double 
reputation” in the sixteenth century: “they were simultaneously believed in 
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as a needed mechanism for social peace and reintegration, and scoffed at as 
a sham.”270 
Like letters of remission, bypass petitions are also widely 
granted.271 Might they also have the same double reputation as their 
sixteenth-century counterparts?272 Part VI takes up the question of the 
hearings as sham, but here I want to consider how the hearings, like pardon 
tales, satisfy the needs of social order. To do this it helps to ask just what 
functions the hearings serve. The question of purpose is an important one: 
as citizens, we should reasonably expect to know the purpose of a law so 
that we can decide if that purpose is worthy as well as to assess whether the 
law accomplishes its intended purpose, or any other. While the bypass 
hearings may serve multiple purposes, I focus here on one. This is the use 
of bypass hearings to punish young women seeking an abortion. The 
hearings are a deliberate and rather clever form of punishment for a 
reproductive decision that is subject to no other form of state sanction 
because abortion is now legal. The hearings act as a sophisticated shaming 
mechanism, an engagement with law that appears on the up and up but that 
intensifies the minor’s humiliation and fear (of participation, of exposure, of 
outcome) precisely because it takes place in a court of law. Moreover, I 
suggest that the harms experienced by virtue of the hearings are not simply 
incidental to the bypass process but are intended as an integral part of it. 
A. Deterrence 
In characterizing bypass hearings as punitive, I use the word not in 
the criminal sense of the deprivation of liberty or a fine, but rather to 
describe action that is intended either as retribution or deterrent. We are 
familiar with this usage in other non-criminal contexts: punitive damages, 
punitive interest rates, and so on. The idea in all of these is to sanction and 
so to discourage behavior that is deemed offensive but that falls short of a 
criminal offense. 
The idea of the hearings as a deterrent is interesting, although 
whether it is sex, pregnancy, or abortion that is to be deterred, it is hard to 
say. Most minors have no idea parental involvement laws exist until they 
discover they are pregnant and begin investigating their options. There is 
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nothing, for example, about parental involvement laws in present state sex-
education curricula. To the extent these laws mean to deter anything, it 
seems to be the hearings themselves. While presented as alternatives—
“your parents or a hearing”—the two are not offered up as equal choices. 
Girls are meant to choose the parental path on the understanding that 
something worse awaits them if they don’t. As one Texas Supreme Court 
justice candidly explained, “[o]nce a minor becomes aware of what she 
must go through to obtain a judicial bypass, she will choose for herself to 
involve her parents.”273 Of course, the in terrorem effect does not work 
entirely as hoped. Hearings take place. Parents are bypassed. Indeed, it is 
impossible to measure the extent to which the bypass process works at all; 
we simply don’t know whether or how many girls decide to notify their 
parents when faced with a hearing. We do know, however, that more than 
half of all pregnant minors inform their parents even without a legal 
requirement to do so.274 For those girls who petition, it seems that only the 
terror and not the effect remains. 
But on the general point, let us not be coy. The bypass process is 
meant to prevent abortion. As four justices of the Alabama Supreme Court 
candidly stated: 
[I]t seems clear that the [Alabama] legislature intended, in 
adopting the Parental Consent Statute, to preserve the life of the 
unborn, and that it deliberately was doing what it could within the 
constraints of the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, to accomplish that 
purpose.275 
The means of preserving unborn life is understood to be parental 
suasion or control. Thus an Alabama judge held that the court lacked 
jurisdiction “to order the procedure sought in this matter which will result in 
the extinction of a four-month old human life when the child’s family is 
fully informed and able to make this decision.”276 Of course, we don’t really 
know whether all parents would oppose their daughter’s decision; the 
Alabama judge might be as distressed if the minor’s family agreed with 
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their daughter, consented, and helped her arrange the abortion. In any event, 
as the Alabama Supreme Court justices themselves acknowledged, abortion 
is constitutionally protected. Legislating as close as possible to the 
permissible line as an expression of constitutional dismay doesn’t seem 
good enough, especially when the exercise of a right and the quality of its 
exercise is at stake. 
B. Counseling and Consent 
Might the hearings serve a counseling function? Certainly nothing 
in the statutes authorizes judges to do more than assess a minor’s maturity 
and best interests. Moreover, most judges have no interest—and few have 
any training—in counseling minors about pregnancy resolution. Beyond 
disinterest and inability, there has been concern about the nature of 
counseling that has been offered. Some judges have been unwaveringly 
judgmental and moralistic: an Alaskan judge denied a minor’s petition on 
the ground that it was “not an act of maturity on her part to put the burden 
of the death of this child upon the conscience of the Court”;277 petitioners in 
Alabama have been ordered to undergo counseling at a pro-life pregnancy 
center called Sav-a-Life.278 
This is not to say that counseling in general is a bad idea. It is a 
standard and valued service provided by private organizations such as 
Planned Parenthood and Jane’s Due Process (JDP). A glimpse through the 
JDP booklet, Legal Rights for Pregnant Teenagers in Texas, is instructive: 
it offers nonjudgmental information on resources and services offered to 
minors, not just regarding abortion, but on parenting, adoption, education, 
emancipation and child support.279 Indeed, to the extent that anything good 
has come out of the bypass process, it may be the extrajudicial system of 
assistance for pregnant minors that has in some places arisen in its wake.280 
An additional justification for the hearings is that they ensure that 
the minor’s consent will be voluntary. The issue of voluntariness appears 
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regularly in the politics of bypass enactment. The argument is that 
permitting teen abortion without parental involvement or a judicial hearing 
is simply a gift to abusive adult men who will impregnate girls and force 
them to abort. (Let us put aside cases where minors have been impregnated 
by their own fathers).281 In the 2008 California initiative campaign, a 
leading pro-parental involvement message was “Stop Child Predators: On a 
daily basis, older men exploit young girls and use secret abortions to cover 
up their crimes.”282 In a 2007 Mississippi case, that charge was extended to 
include mothers too. In Sherron v. State, a mother consented to an abortion 
for her fourteen year old daughter under the state parental involvement 
laws.283 The pregnancy was the result of rape by the daughter’s stepfather. 
The mother was charged and convicted as an accessory after the fact to her 
husband’s crime of statutory rape for “giving the assistance that her 
daughter had to receive from one of her parents if she was to be permitted 
an abortion without a court order.”284 The mother had argued that her sole 
intent in consenting was to help her daughter;285 the daughter has testified 
that she had “no doubts about wanting to have an abortion. She did not want 
to give birth to and raise a child fathered by [her step-father].”286 
Nonetheless, the jury found sufficient evidence to suggest the mother’s 
motives in consenting were mixed and that consent for the abortion was 
given in part to hide her husband’s crime.287 The court declined to rule on 
whether the criminal prosecution of a mother who consents to a daughter’s 
abortion unduly burdens the minor’s recognized constitutional right.288 
Doctors too are viewed as sources of coercion. There is much pro-
life discussion about the abortion “industry” and some of this has found its 
                                            
281 See id. at 7 (noting how a staff member of a state department of social services 
mistakenly assumed that a twelve-year-old pregnant by her father needed her father’s 
consent to obtain an abortion). 
282 Sarah’s Law: Yes on 4, http://www.yeson4.net/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
283 Sherron v. State, 959 So. 2d 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). 
284 Id. at 36. 
285 Id. at 24. 
286 Id. at 33. 
287 Id. at 40–41 (upholding conviction because “[w]hen an act is done with 
multiple intents, it may be criminalized if one of the intents is an element of the relevant 
offense”). 
288 Id. at 36. 
2009] Decisional Dignity 475 
way into bypass decisions. An Alabama judge denied a petition on the 
ground that the minor was not sufficiently informed. Despite having 
received counseling from medical staff at a clinic, she had been unable to 
talk personally with the physician who would perform the abortion. The 
judge stated, “You know, these people are interested in one thing it appears 
to me and this is getting this young lady’s money. . . . This is a beautiful 
young girl with a bright future and she does not need to have a butcher get 
ahold of her.”289 The denial was upheld on appeal. In this case, when asked 
about the specifics of the abortion procedure, the minor had testified that: 
I understand they have a local anesthetic which they’ll give you 
anesthesia. They also have this oral medicine that you can take. 
When you take that, it numbs the bottom half of your body. And 
they would go in with an aspirator which is like a vacuum or 
sucking machine. And they go in there around the uterus wall and 
they just suck it out. That is what they [three different nurses at 
different clinics] told me.290 
In all other forms of medical treatment, society trusts the physician 
to assess the quality of the patient’s consent.291 Society is generally satisfied 
that doctors behave professionally with regard to the provision of services, 
and any lingering insecurities are assuaged by the presence of the tort 
system and a robust understanding within the medical community of the 
meaning of “battery.” Even for minors, there is little concern about coercion 
with regard to other medical care for which parental consent is not required, 
such as contraception or treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. In this 
respect, abortion is exceptional and judicial supervision duplicative. 
Physicians must always make an independent determination about the 
voluntariness of a patient’s consent. Maryland has codified this rule for teen 
abortion; a physician may perform an abortion on a minor if, in his 
professional judgment, “the minor is mature and capable of giving informed 
consent.”292 
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C. Bypass Symbolism 
So we return to the question of what functions bypass hearings 
serve. Certainly they have expressive or symbolic value, though we want to 
look closely at just what they express before deciding the purpose is useful, 
benign, or deserving of support. For some, the legislation stands as a 
statement of opposition to abortion. But bypass symbolism goes beyond 
opposition to abortion because teenage abortion is more than a decision 
about reproduction. Bypass laws pull together a bundle of testy issues—
teenage sexuality and sexual practices, parental and filial obedience, unwed 
motherhood and reproductive control. In the good old days, each of these 
was a matter of great interest to law. Until the 1970s, courts were formally 
on the side of parents. Sexual activity was a common basis of status offense 
jurisdiction over girls;293 pregnancy was grounds for school expulsion. 
Maintaining this sense of moral order was upheld by the medical 
community as well as by law. Physicians who served on hospital 
committees that assessed women’s requests for abortion were “very 
concerned with what they took to be their role in the postwar cultural 
mandate to protects and preserve the links between sexuality, femininity, 
marriage and maternity.”294 
But reform schools, maternity homes, and hospital abortion 
committees are now a thing of the past; pregnant high-schoolers are no 
longer expelled and abortion is legal. This is a matter of dismay for some. 
Parents particularly may feel that they are unsupported and that things have 
gone badly out of control. On this account, parental bypass legislation 
symbolizes resistance and perhaps a bit of nostalgia. It is not for nothing 
that Michigan calls its statute the Parental Rights Restoration Act.295 The 
very existence of a parental involvement statute demonstrates that, in this 
state anyway, abortion is not available “on demand,” especially for 
teenagers who have gone out and gotten themselves pregnant. It is, of 
course, important to keep in mind that abortion is not available “on 
demand” for anybody. Even adult women must comply with the sizeable set 
of requirements discussed earlier, and all of these apply to minors as well.296 
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To be sure, the value of bypass hearings is not only symbolic. It is 
also political, to the extent the two can be pulled apart. Throughout the 
1980s, support for parental involvement statutes proved crucial in several 
contested gubernatorial campaigns, including those of otherwise 
progressive governors like Bill Clinton and Christine Whitman, who, by 
supporting restrictions on abortion for daughters, successfully straddled the 
family values fence by being pro-choice and pro-parent at the same time.297 
Legislators can even manage to be pro-teen, if pressed, by supporting the 
therapeutic benefits of bypass hearings for minors’ mental and physical 
health. 
But there has to be a more robust answer to why bypass legislation 
makes any sense than the fact that it makes legislators and some parents 
look tough. If even in the face of a daunting hearing, girls are still going to 
court, and still succeeding, then it is important to understand what the 
hearings are about. 
D. Punishment 
Here we circle back to the deeply troubling hypothesis that bypass 
hearings operate as a form of punishment. The hearings cause, and are 
intended to cause, great distress to vulnerable young women who are 
already experiencing the predicaments of unwanted pregnancy in 
circumstances of perceived isolation from their families. As the Texas 
Supreme Court justice quoted above reminds us, bypass laws are meant to 
“sufficiently impress[] upon minors . . . that the State wants the parents to 
be informed.”298 But the impression has force only if the hearing is 
understood and functions as an ordeal. It is not hard to understand how that 
comes about. Unhappily pregnant girls learn when they seek medical care 
that in order to have an abortion they must first file papers, talk to a lawyer, 
testify in court, and each time review and rehearse details of their home 
lives, contraceptive failures, and private hopes for the future. 
The hearings are, in short, the price young women are expected to 
pay for seeking an abortion and for having sex, and for doing both without 
owning up to their parents. As the presiding judge of an Ohio juvenile court 
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told a minor’s attorney after denying the petition of his college-bound 
client, she had just not had enough “hard knocks.”299 Parents too sometimes 
regard bypass participation as the proper price of ending a pregnancy. 
Lawyers representing pregnant minors report that some parents have 
refused to consent after being asked by their daughter, even knowing that 
she is likely to succeed at the hearing: “You have to go through judicial 
bypass. This is your responsibility, not mine.”300 Interestingly, the “hard 
knock” school of thought also seems to apply to teenagers who decide not 
to abort. In describing the efforts of pregnant minors to continue their 
schooling, the head of Pregnant Related Services at the Texas Education 
Agency explained, “There are certainly districts where pregnancy is still 
punished . . . . Every year we get calls from parents and students saying 
their district just tells them, ‘you’ve made your bed and now you lie in it 
because we’re not going to help you.’”301 
As these comments reveal, those who administer the law are indeed 
often able to “work their own view of substantive justice into the law.”302 At 
one level, the phenomenon is not surprising. As Malcolm Feeley has noted, 
“[t]he law is a normative ordering that touches people in an important way. 
Criminal justice officials are not exempt from this; most respond intensely 
to their tasks, and how they perform their duties is determined in part by 
their sense of justice.”303 Legal abortion offends the sense of justice of some 
judges. A Mississippi Supreme Court justice put it clearly in a 2001 
opinion: “Ever since the abomination known as Roe v. Wade became the 
law of the land, the morality of our great nation has slipped ever so 
downwards to the point that the decision to spare the life of an unborn child 
has become an arbitrary decision based on convenience.”304 
I suspect the question will be raised: what’s so bad about a little 
slap on the wrist by process if girls can get their abortions? One answer is 
that the law reserves punishment for those convicted of wrongdoing, and on 
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that score, bypass petitioners don’t qualify. They have filed a civil petition 
in a non-adversarial action: there is no prosecutor, no indictment, no 
sentencing. Even so, the procedure often “reads” as criminal all the way 
down. Bypass petitioners are clear about this. As one Massachusetts minor 
put it, “I’m only 16, and usually at this age, you know you don’t see people 
going to court for good things.”305 It is as though if abortion can’t be made 
illegal, it can still be made to feel illegal. 
It is not enough to say that some people think that subjecting young 
women to this form of humiliation is just what they deserve or is only a 
small price for them to pay. In the Isle of Mann “birching” case discussed 
earlier, the state had similarly argued that the “judicial corporal punishment 
at issue in this case was not in breach of the Convention since it did not 
outrage public opinion.”306 The European Court rejected this view: 
Even assuming that local public opinion can have an incidence on 
the interpretation of the concept of “degrading punishment” 
appearing in Article 3, the Court does not regard it as established 
that judicial corporal punishment is not considered degrading by 
those members of the Manx population who favour its retention: 
it might well be that one of the reasons why they view the penalty 
as an effective deterrent is precisely the element of degradation 
which it involves.307 
VI. HARM TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 
I have focused on harms that bypass hearings impose on young 
women. But the legal system itself is compromised by virtue of the process. 
The hearings produce an engagement with law which challenges the 
integrity of the legal process in a number of ways, and I look here at 
several: the problem of ritualization and of sham, hearings as politicized 
shaming mechanisms and as the source of disillusionment with law, the 
“luck of the draw” problem, and the illegitimacy of denying minors a 
forum. 
I turn first to the issue of ritual and sham and look at divorce 
hearings brought by unhappily married couples in the period before no-
fault. These hearings, which led to the downfall of fault-based divorce, shed 
significant light on the bypass process and perhaps on its future. In 
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considering whether bypass hearings have aspects of sham hearings, I want 
to be clear that many bypass judges diligently attempt to discern whether a 
petitioner has adequately proved her maturity or best interests. Yet, many 
other bypass judges seem to fall into one of two categories: those who 
approve nearly all petitions and those who grant none at all. Judges who 
commonly grant petitions may be operating on something like a 
presumption that minors who are able to organize participation in a hearing 
have by that fact alone come close to demonstrating maturity. Those who 
grant none are generally opposed to abortion on religious grounds, or are 
opposed to granting a bypass petition on political ones. In either case, it 
might be argued there is little deep inquiry into the minor’s maturity, 
although the appellate cases suggest this has been particularly so with 
regard to denials. 
Several factors combine to bring about this result. One is the 
capaciousness of the standards for maturity and best interests that judge are 
to apply. But these standards are nothing new: in the area of child custody, 
for example, judges use them all the time. Why then should bypass cases 
prove so problematic? Part of the answer is the intrusion of politics into the 
hearing, where the contentious topic of abortion is posed center stage. At 
the same time, each individual bypass hearing is not intended as a private 
referendum on the question of abortion. 
A. Fault-Based Divorce: Hearings as Sham 
Before grounds for divorce were modified to include the all-
encompassing “irreconcilable differences,” a divorce petitioner had to plead 
and prove specific grounds of misconduct such as adultery, desertion, 
various degrees of cruelty, and habitual alcoholism.308 Spouses who had not 
deserted one another or been cruel or adulterous (and had no desire to be) 
were in a pinch. If these couples wanted to divorce, they had to engage in a 
different sort of misconduct: collusion, the agreement to testify falsely that 
one or the other had engaged in one of the fault-based behaviors.309 In states 
that required corroboration, parties brought in “correspondents,” 
professional accomplices who were paid not to engage in actual wrong-
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doing but to testify that they had done so.310 Lawrence Friedman explains 
that “this meant that the plaintiff not only had to lie herself, she had to bring 
in an auxiliary liar as well.”311 Despite the fact that collusion was a bar to 
divorce, the practice was rampant.312 Friedman notes that after 1870, most 
divorces were collusive: “there was no real courtroom dispute . . . [t]he 
‘lawsuit’ was essentially a sham.”313 
How did unhappy spouses become so sophisticated in figuring out 
how to bypass the strictures of fault-based divorce? The answer is that they 
were instructed by able matrimonial attorneys who tutored their clients not 
only on what to wear during staged indiscretions but on how to plead and 
testify in court.314 Lawyers would lead the aggrieved spouse through a 
series of questions to which she would reply in monosyllables: 
Q: [Mrs. X], during your marriage to Mr. X, has he on many 
occasions been cold and indifferent to you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And as a result of this conduct on the part of your husband, 
have you become seriously ill, nervous, and upset? 
A: Yes.315 
The example was typical of “the melancholy and perfunctory litany 
of uncontested divorce, recited daily in courtrooms throughout the State.”316 
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In sum, divorce hearings consisted of perjury-filled testimony organized by 
the bar, performed by the litigants, and tolerated by the bench: “[t]he law 
was an ostrich; it was part of its formal strategy to bury its head in the 
sand.”317 
In describing this process, the point is not that these unhappy 
couples should have been required to remain married. It was not the result 
of the hearings that was perverse, but rather the corruption of legal process 
to reach the result. Over time, the nature of the process provoked the radical 
reform of the underlying rule. That so many husbands and wives were 
willing to swear to invented affairs and cruelty finally persuaded everyone 
that the law should accommodate their marital preferences rather than 
suborn their testimony. According to the influential California Governor’s 
Commission on the Family, the introduction of no-fault divorce “will put an 
end to the dissimulation, hypocrisy—and even outright perjury—which is 
engendered by the present system.”318 The notoriety of their own complicity 
brought the fault-based system down, as judges and attorneys became 
unable to participate in a charade of justice.319 
Are bypass hearings also simply performances by pregnant teens 
who will say whatever it takes to get to yes? No, I am not suggesting that 
teenage petitioners, like divorce litigants of old, make things up in their 
hearings. They want an abortion and they can describe, if sometimes in 
teenspeak, the circumstances of their lives that led them to make this 
decision and to do so without formally involving a parent. 
Nonetheless, something like the ritualistic recitations of the fault-
based divorce hearings can sometimes be found in the bypass context. As 
one disgruntled Texas judge stated, “Doe’s evidence that she is mature and 
sufficiently well informed is very limited, consisting almost entirely of 
monosyllabic answers to conclusory questions posed by her counsel.”320 In 
affirming the denial of bypass petition, a Florida court noted that: 
In a similar vein showing failure to develop facts, i.e., sufficient 
evidence rather than conclusory statements, her counsel asked 
Ms. Doe if she had considered all the alternatives to terminating 
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her pregnancy. The monosyllabic answer was “yes.” When asked 
if she had given her decision to terminate the pregnancy long and 
thoughtful consideration, she answered “Mm hm.” When asked if 
this had been a difficult decision to arrive at, she answered again 
simply “yes.”321 
It seems that judges fear they are being scammed by monosyllables. 
(A similar suspicion arose in the quasi-legal hospital review boards of the 
1950s and 1960s; one board physician “spoke for many of his colleagues 
when he warned of the ‘clever, scheming women, simply trying to 
hoodwink the psychiatrist and the obstetrician’ when they asked permission 
to abort.”)322 If a “yes” or an “mm hm” satisfies as evidence of maturity, do 
the hearings not have something in common with the stylized recitations of 
fault-based divorce? On the other hand, monosyllabic yes and no answers 
might be more manageable for young women on the stand than detailed 
judicial interrogations into their moral reasoning and birth control habits. It 
may also be reasonable in a hearing where the minor’s demeanor may count 
for everything, for her attorney to examine her in a more direct fashion. 
Certainly judges may intervene and ask questions (as many do) if they find 
the advocate’s questions or the petitioner’s answers lacking.323 
Many judges do not intervene because they believe nothing more is 
necessary. Consider the earnest testimony of a Minnesota judge, one of a 
small cohort responsible for hearing most of the state’s bypass cases: 
I know as a judge you would like to think your decisions are 
important, that you are providing some—you are doing some 
legitimate purpose. What I have come to believe . . . [is] that 
really the judicial function is merely a rubber stamp. The decision 
has already been made before they have gotten to my chambers. 
The young women I have seen have been very mature and 
capable of giving the required consent.324 
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Another Minnesota judge characterized his function as “a routine clerical 
function on my part, just like putting my seal and stamp on it.”325 There is 
no thought here that the judiciary of Minnesota is lax. Rather, it appears that 
most judges accept that pregnant teenagers who have demonstrated the 
wherewithal to complete and file legal papers, meet with counsel, and come 
to court are mature enough to decide about an abortion. While taking charge 
of a predicament in this way may not be absolute proof of maturity, it 
would seem persuasive indeed. 
B. HUAC and Shame 
This aspect of the bypass process—hearings where the important 
facts are known at the outset—is illuminated by another well-known 
example from the mid-twentieth century, the hearings held by the U.S. 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in the early 1950s to 
investigate the supposed disloyalty of citizens suspected of having ties to 
the Communist Party. A prominent feature of these public, televised 
hearings was the testimony of subpoenaed witnesses asked to “name 
names” of colleagues or others known to them to have Communist ties. But 
as Victor Navasky has explained, the Committee already had the names: 
“the witnesses who named names publicly preceded their public testimony 
with private, executive-session rehearsals, which means that the public 
hearings were indeed largely ceremonial.”326 What purpose did the hearings 
then serve? Navasky argues that they were simply “degradation 
ceremonies”; the public recitation was simply “the final proof that a witness 
had broken with his past.”327 
The comparison with bypass hearings is not a happy one. While we 
can appreciate a difference between degradation and humiliation,328 the 
difference may not signify much for the minor herself. The hearings are 
humiliating for participants, whether they are closely questioned by a judge 
or simply led through the basics by their own attorney. The testimony of 
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bypass petitioners is more private than that of witnesses called before 
HUAC, but it is still a compelled performance concerning the speaker’s 
innermost commitments, here familial (do I want a child now?) rather than 
political. 
And just as the HUAC hearings were staged to combat a subversive 
political threat to the American way of life, on some accounts legal abortion 
is similarly understood as a subversive threat to cherished values. For some, 
abortion undermines a way things once seemed to be, a world of obedient 
daughters and orderly families. For others, abortion itself is the threat. For 
still others—and the categories are not exclusive—the hearings represent an 
objectionable and on-going form of judicial activism that started with 
Roe.329 As we have seen, each of these anxieties appears in reported bypass 
case law as well as in the unreported law produced and experienced, 
hearing by hearing. The law discredits itself by using pro forma hearings to 
put girls through the wringer when there is little factual doubt about the 
decisional maturity of a particular petitioner. Yet there is an additional 
reason why judicial bypass hearings serve the law badly. They produce not 
only dread before the experience and humiliation during, but 
disillusionment with justice after. 
C. Fairness and Legitimacy 
As noted earlier, encounters with courts are where many people 
form their impressions of the American justice system.330 Tom Tyler has 
explained that “if judges treat [people] fairly by listening to their arguments, 
by being neutral, and by stating good reasons for his or her decision, people 
will react positively to their experience,” whatever the substantive 
outcome.331 In this way procedural fairness is understood to increase law’s 
legitimacy. 
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Do bypass hearings meet these basic criteria of neutrality and 
fairness? Certainly not in every instance. We have seen petitions denied for 
reasons that defy the logic of the process, as when the minor’s pregnancy 
itself is declared the ground for immaturity. 
The disillusioning practices of unfairness take other forms as well, 
as when judges apply the law in ways that disregard any plausible principle 
of charity inherent in the concept of fairness. Consider a 2008 Florida 
bypass case in which a seventeen-year-old high school senior was asked 
about her plans after graduation.332 She replied that she was “going to go to 
H.C.C. [Hillsborough Community College] for two years and then . . . 
transferring to U.S.F. [University of South Florida] for maybe a 
pharmaceutical degree or a pediatrician.”333 Her petition was denied on the 
grounds of immaturity, and much hinged on the meaning of the word 
“plan.” In affirming the denial, the judge explained that: 
Ms. Doe’s testimony is indicative of an educational aspiration or 
ultimate career goal. It is not, however, indicative of a plan . . . . 
For example, as a senior in high school, and midway through the 
academic year, evidence that she had in fact submitted an 
application for admission to the educational institution she 
identified would suggest a true plan. Generally, admission 
requires an appropriate test score from a recognized testing 
organization. The taking of such a test is substantial factual 
evidence of a plan. Proof of acceptance, in my view, would 
provide further factual support, although being denied acceptance 
does not indicate lack of a plan or lack of maturity. Alternatively, 
testimony that Ms. Doe is presently embarking on her plan and 
has identified the requirements for admission would also have 
been of evidentiary value. . . . I do not imply that she has not 
done these things, only that she failed to present to the trial judge 
sufficient, detailed evidence of mature behavior in furthering any 
plan for her education . . . .334 
What are we to make of this speech? Certainly it provides guidance 
for Florida attorneys advising subsequent bypass petitioners about preparing 
a more detailed evidentiary record in the short and intense moments of 
consultation they have with their clients. But it also shows that if a judge 
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wants to find a girl immature, there is almost always room to do so. I do not 
know the application deadlines for Hillsborough Community College, and I 
suspect neither did the judge. Maybe the Florida Jane Doe will never end up 
as a pediatrician or pharmacist. But she has grasped the relationship 
between her educational aspirations and motherhood; she does understand 
how one progresses from local to regional schools. One suspects that even 
she understood that her failure to provide her SAT scores is not why her 
petition was denied. 
On occasion, the relation between the integrity of the justice system 
and truly egregious judicial conduct regarding the bypass process is 
recognized and addressed. In 1992, trial judge Francis Bourisseau gave a 
news interview in which he stated that he might grant a bypass petition in 
the case of a white girl raped by a black man.335 In affirming his censure, 
the Michigan Supreme Court held that these remarks were “clearly 
prejudicial to the administration of justice”; the judge’s conduct “called into 
question the impartiality of the judiciary, and exposed the judicial system to 
contempt and ridicule.”336 But it is worth looking at Judge Bourisseau’s 
remarks and the court’s objections to them more closely. In the full 
interview, the judge had stated that he didn’t want to have “blood on his 
hands” for participating in permitting abortions at all; 337 the racialized rape 
example was simply an exception to his general policy of denying all 
bypass petitions. That judicial conduct—ordinary day to day denials 
because the judge thinks abortion is murder—is not generally regarded as 
subjecting the system to contempt, though it cannot be fairly regarded 
otherwise. 
D. The Dignitarian Luck of the Draw 
Not all judges who oppose abortion, or who for reasons of electoral 
politics refuse to be associated with authorizing an abortion, call into 
question the impartiality of the judiciary. The outcome of a petition may 
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depend entirely on who hears the case. Consider the heartfelt statement of 
an Ohio judge: 
It’s really tough. I’m as Roman Catholic as you can get and I 
follow the church’s teachings. But where these cases come before 
the court, I must follow the law. Whether I agree with (a girl’s) 
decision is another matter.338 
But there is something terribly wrong with a legal procedure that 
can be aptly captured by the headline of an investigative story in the local 
paper, “Abortion Waivers are a Judicial Crapshoot.”339 I recognize that to 
some extent, luck is always a feature of the administration of justice.340 
Nonetheless, there should be limits on the system’s tolerance for luck, 
especially when luck determines not only the outcome, but finding a forum 
in the first place and how forum finders are treated throughout the process. 
This aspect of the process—the luck of the draw aspect—relates 
directly to the concept of dignity. In analyzing what is wrong with shaming 
sanctions—such as publishing the names, pictures, and crimes of convicted 
offenders—James Q. Whitman has observed that objections to shaming 
often rest on the liberal argument that there are limits on how the state may 
punish: depriving a person of liberty or property is acceptable; depriving 
them of dignity is not.341 Toni Massaro explains that shaming mechanisms 
“authorize public officials to search for and destroy or damage an 
offender’s dignity . . . [which is] an Orwellian prospect.”342 But there is 
another way in which shaming implicates dignity. Whitman argues that 
shaming is a “peculiarly disturbing species of lynch justice”; it works 
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because of “an ugly complicity” between the state and the crowd. Because a 
shamed offender does not know just how far the public will go with the 
information, or just what they will do, shaming acts as a kind of “posse-
raising legal politics.”343 This violates what Whitman identifies as 
“transactional dignity: 
a deeply rooted norm of our society that persons should never be 
forced to deal with wild or unpredictable partners. . . . It is the 
dignity involved in having the right to know what kind of deal 
one has struck, and on what terms.344 
This conception of dignity illuminates the bypass process with 
regard to the predictability of encounters between legal subjects and the 
state. Serendipity is not supposed to be embedded in, nor tolerated by, the 
processes by which people exercise their rights. The deal minors have 
struck, or have been handed, is to participate in a hearing before a judge. 
They are not assured that every petition will be granted, but they are 
entitled to have their petitions accepted and their evidence evaluated fairly. 
This is the core of the “transaction” that we consider legal process to be. 
Unpredictability occasioned by moral or political disagreement on the part 
of a judge shakes this deeply rooted norm, the more so since it is not the 
crowd but the court itself whom petitioners have reason to fear. 
I am not suggesting that bypass judges act like vigilantes exactly, 
treating bypass petitioners as many communities treat child molesters, 
trying to run them out of town by offering them no quarter.345 Nonetheless, 
some judges have closed their courthouses to would-be petitioners, and 
others have made it possible to identify petitioners who are then subject to 
whatever informal sanctions come their way. Philosopher Jeffrie Murphy 
has characterized shaming punishments as “coercive exercise[s] in 
humiliation and degradation—a kind of smug and mean-spirited vengeance 
with tendencies to lap into arbitrary cruelty.”346 We have already seen 
examples of mean-spiritedness in the bypass context, but we should not lose 
sight of the arbitrariness of it all. 
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E. The Illegitimacy of Forum Exclusion 
Finally, I want to consider the problem of forum exclusion not only 
as unacceptably burdening minors, but as unacceptably discrediting the 
legal system itself. The U.S. Supreme Court considered this problem in a 
somewhat different context in the early 1970s. At that time the state of 
Connecticut charged couples seeking a divorce sixty dollars in fees and 
costs.347 Representing a class of indigent women seeking to divorce, 
plaintiff Gladys Boddie argued that because she couldn’t afford the sixty 
dollars, she was denied access to the court and thus to due process itself, 
even in a civil matter.348 Deciding for Boddie, the Court made two 
foundational observations. The first was that Connecticut had created a 
monopoly over the dissolution of marriage: spouses who sought to divorce 
could do so only through the judicial process.349 Second, the Court 
acknowledged the state’s long-standing interest in the institution of 
marriage.350 The two combined to create a circumstance in which a judicial 
hearing was “the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental 
human relationship.”351 
In holding that “due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a 
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to 
settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be 
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard,”352 the Court recognized that 
all earlier cases concerning access to court involved criminal defendants, 
not civil plaintiffs. Nonetheless, it characterized Boddie’s “plight . . . [as] 
akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum 
effectively empowered to settle their disputes.”353 Her “resort to the judicial 
process . . . is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the 
defendant called upon to defend his interests in court. For both groups this 
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process is not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, 
the only available one.”354 
The plight of a bypass petitioner denied access to a bypass hearing 
is similarly akin to that of Mrs. Boddie (and, by implication, to the criminal 
defendant as well). Certainly there are differences: bypass exclusions result 
not from rules of court but from a judge’s personal preference, and, unlike 
divorce litigants locked in by residency requirements, bypass petitioners 
may be able to travel and obtain either a hearing or an abortion in another 
state. But there are crucial similarities. Abortion is a matter in which the 
state has a great interest, and, like divorce, it too involves “the adjustment 
of a fundamental human relationship.”355 Moreover, the state has created a 
monopoly for itself over the resolution of a minor’s abortion decision. 
Indeed, Martin Guggenheim has argued that the bypass arrangement gives 
judges not just a monopoly but an impermissible veto over the young’ 
woman’s decision.356 
To be clear, my argument here is not about the denial of due 
process to minors (although others may be interested in the project).357 My 
concern is the harm inflicted by the bypass process on the legal system 
itself. A similar concern was recognized in Boddie. As the Court made 
clear, at the point where a “judicial proceeding becomes the only effective 
means of resolving the dispute at hand,” the “denial of a defendant’s full 
access to that process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.”358 One way 
of expressing the gravity of the problem is as a constitutional violation. But 
the values that underlie the Fourteenth Amendment—the premises “that this 
Court has through years of adjudication [used to] put flesh upon the due 
process principle”359—register even outside the formal constitutional 
framework. Although bypass hearings are not about dispute settlement (or 
are not supposed to be) the Court’s concerns in Boddie apply: 
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American society bottoms its systematic definition of individual 
rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, 
not on custom or the will of strategically placed individuals, but 
on the common-law model. It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial 
official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of 
a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement . . . Only by 
providing that the social enforcement mechanism must function 
strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered 
society that is also just.360 
VII. ABORTION POLITICS AND BYPASS PROCESSES 
The politics of abortion is apparent in both the structure and the 
judicial implementation of the bypass process. Certain interventions have 
been procedural. These include judges appointing counsel for the fetus,361 
establishing a higher than usual burden of proof by taking an imagined 
parental perspective into account,362 and denying petitions on extra-
statutory grounds, such as requiring the minor to be “extraordinarily 
mature.”363 Judicial opposition to abortion has also colored how the 
hearings are conducted. Judges have questioned petitioners as though 
abortion’s legality was unresolved, as though the only measure of a 
petitioner’s maturity was the decision not to abort and the hearing offered a 
chance to remonstrate against it. They have asked petitioning minors 
whether they understand that abortion is murder, whether they would kill 
their own three-year-old child, whether they change their mind about 
abortion if they knew their baby would go to a loving adoptive family or if 
they were given $2000.364 Bypass denials have been sprinkled with pro-life 
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sentiment: “This is a capital case. It involves the question whether [the 
minor’s] unborn child should live or die.”365 And some judges refuse to hear 
bypass cases at all. 
Judicial opposition to abortion may stem from a judge’s religious 
beliefs or from concerns about election, or both. Some 87% of all state and 
local judges now run for election in some form or other,366 and a study of 
judicial elections over a twenty-five-year period shows that abortion has 
become a prominent issue in judicial campaigns.367 Judicial candidates have 
advertised themselves as being pro-life during an election,368 and have 
publicly celebrated the fact thereafter.369 
In this last section, I want to make three points about the relation 
between judicial elections and the fair administration of justice in the 
bypass setting. The first is simply that the two issues cannot be isolated 
from one another. To avoid being associated with abortion at all, judges 
have fought to keep their names off reported bypass decisions, 
unsuccessfully in Ohio370 and successfully in Texas.371 From a political 
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point of view, this may make sense. The official 2006 platform of the Texas 
Republican Party called for the “electoral defeat of all judges who through 
raw judicial activism seek to nullify the Parental Consent Law by wantonly 
granting bypasses to minor girls seeking abortion.”372 
A Kentucky case further illustrates the relationship between 
elections and the bypass process. In 1991, Jed Deters, a candidate for a 
district court judgeship in Northern Kentucky, ran political ads in two local 
newspapers stating “Jed Deters is a Pro-Life Candidate.”373 Deters lost the 
election but was censured by the Kentucky Judicial Retirement and 
Removal Commission for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct canon 
prohibiting “statements that commit or appear to commit” a candidate with 
respect to cases, controversies, or issues likely to come before the court.374 
In upholding Deters’ censure on appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
expressed “no doubt” that Deters had intended to commit himself on pro-
life issues; as he “freely testified that ‘any good Catholic is pro-life,’ that 
Kenyon County has a high percentage of Catholic voters, and that his 
statement . . . would ‘hopefully’ give him a ‘distinct edge in the race,’ since 
‘you’re in it to win. You do what it takes.’”375 
Deters argued that he had not violated the canon, not because he 
hadn’t committed on the issue, but because no abortion issue was likely to 
come before the court and so the canon didn’t apply. He explained that the 
only two hospitals in the county were Catholic and didn’t provide abortions, 
that there were no abortion clinics, and that not one “abortion-related case” 
had come before the court in ten years.376 The court rejected the argument, 
                                                                                                     
371 Donald, supra note 167. Bypass politics go all the way up. Texas Supreme 
Court Justice Deborah Hankinson was passed over for appointment to the Fifth Circuit by 
President George W. Bush in favor of Justice Priscilla Owens because of their comparative 
positions interpreting Texas’s bypass statute. As attorney Susan Hays observed, “[t]hese are 
members of the Texas Supreme Court. Can you imagine what disclosure would do to a 
small-town, conservative judge?” Id. 
372 Republican Party of Tex., 2006 State Republican Party Platform 15 (June 1, 
2006) , http://www.texasgop.org. 
373 Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 201.  
374 Id. at 202. 
375 Id. at 203. 
376 Id. 
2009] Decisional Dignity 495 
reminding Deters that under state law, a judicial bypass petition might 
indeed come before the court.377 
Of course, Deters probably described the docket in Kenyon County 
accurately. As he pointed out, Cincinnati is only fifteen minutes away (if in 
another state), and local girls may well make the trip if they want to file a 
bypass petition.378 But while Deters may have had his numbers right, I think 
he had the causation wrong. The absence of abortion cases does not 
determine the permissible scope of campaign speech. Pregnant minors who 
know where local judges stand are more likely to try their bypass luck 
elsewhere. 
This leads to the second discouraging point about abortion politics 
and the bypass process. Where judges stand on abortion, as on other 
substantive issues, is likely to become increasingly well-known. In 2002, in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated a Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct provision prohibiting 
judicial candidates from “announcing” their views on disputed legal and 
political issues.379 The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that the prohibition 
violated the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates.380 It is unclear if 
White, which dealt with an “announce” clause necessarily invalidates 
“commit clauses,” of the kind at issue in the Deters case.381 Yet it seems 
quite clear that judicial candidates after White are freer to express their 
views—if not their commitment regarding future cases—on the matter of 
abortion. 
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This is clear from a new study by political scientists challenging the 
conventional wisdom regarding judicial independence and structure of 
judicial elections, which uses decisions on abortion-related cases as its data. 
The thought has long been that nonpartisan elections, where judges’ party 
affiliations are not on the ballot or on their campaign literature, increases 
judicial independence because candidates are freed from the constraints of 
party platforms and from immediate association with candidates for other 
elected offices.382 But the study suggests that nonpartisan elections, in 
which voters have little to work with but claims of character, encourage 
judges to be more responsive to public opinion as single-issue interest 
groups and aggressive media push unaffiliated candidates to articulate their 
views with particularity. Judicial candidates in nonpartisan elections have 
been questioned by state Right to Life Committees (asking if they “believe 
Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided”);383 television ads criticized an 
incumbent by claiming “[in Judge] Janet Stumbo’s opinion . . . there’s no 
criminal liability for killing an unborn child.”384 Certainly the holding in 
White and the “nastier, noisier, and costlier” manner of judicial 
campaigns385 raise deep concerns about the “‘disinterestedness’ of the 
judiciary”386 and about the relation between a politicized bench and the rule 
of law.387 
Yet the proper balance between free speech concerns and judicial 
impartiality is not the focus of this paper. Accepting White as good law, my 
interest is on its impact on the operation of the bypass process. After all, 
Roe and Casey are still good law too. The question I have put on the table is 
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whether in the face of all this good law, judicial hearings are appropriate or 
fair to decide about a minor’s maturity or whether they are a piercing 
misuse of law. In asking the question, I am not challenging the free speech 
rights of judicial candidates. I am suggesting that the demonstrated and 
growing exercise of judicial speech with regard to abortion provides another 
potent reason why bypass hearings should be abandoned as the means of 
supervising teenage abortion decisions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The two objections to the bypass process I have set out—harm to 
girls and harm to the legal system—add up to a third injustice at a societal 
level. A legal system that requires young pregnant women to participate in 
hearings whose main function is to harass and to punish is not the kind of 
system one should expect in a just or decent society. Avishai Margalit has 
identified a decent society as one whose institutions do not cause people to 
feel humiliated.388 Judicial bypass hearings humiliate. They require detailed 
disclosures from vulnerable young women on the most intimate of subjects 
and often for reasons that have little to do with the state’s interest in their 
welfare. This is a considerable and an unjustified intrusion on privacy, 
which is for Margalit “in itself a paradigmatic act of humiliation.”389 
It is particularly distressing that legal process is being used in this 
pursuit. Courthouses, or certainly the old ones, were sites of civic pride: 
they were grand because grand things were decided; law itself was in 
operation. The treatment of minors is the more troubling because there is no 
need to use judicial hearings as the means by which teenage abortion 
decisions are supervised. Nothing about a judicial hearing is constitutionally 
compelled. Bellotti focused on hearings because that was the procedure 
before the Court, but as the Court made clear, “much can be said for 
employing procedures and a forum less formal than those associated with a 
court of general jurisdiction.”390 
Several states have enacted just such measures. Maine, for example, 
authorizes minors either to get the consent of a parent or another adult 
family member or to receive counseling from designated counselors, 
including clergy, nurses, or psychologists. These counselors must provide 
the minor not only with information about abortion but also about adoption, 
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pregnancy, and state benefits for child-rearing.391 Delaware has also 
widened the scope of those to whom a minor might turn: notice can be 
given to a grandparent or a licensed mental health professional instead of 
parent or legal guardian. As in Maine, the person is required to explain that 
“the options available to [the minor] include adoption, abortion, and full-
term pregnancy” and must also agree that it is in the minor’s best interests 
to waive parental consent.392 
These more capacious mechanisms for adult involvement in a 
minor’s abortion decision make great sense. Teenagers are commonly 
connected to a broader network of communities than their immediate 
families and the law should take advantage of those connections.393 If there 
is legislative concern about minors proceeding without adult participation 
(other than the physician), offering minors an array of trusted sources may 
well produce a more individualized, more sustained, and more substantive 
intervention than the haphazard and often reluctant participation by a judge. 
After all, the judge has no stake in the particular minor, does no follow-up, 
and is unlikely ever to see her again. In contrast, those she trusts are likely 
to be available at all stages of her decision–making process and after, and to 
treat her fairly along the way. 
Each year over one million women in the United States decide, 
usually for a combination of reasons—their finances, their aspirations for 
the future, the absence of their partner, their obligations to existing children, 
and their health or that of the fetus—not to continue a pregnancy.394 Put 
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another way, forty percent of all American women will have had an 
abortion before their reproductive years are over.395 These numbers suggest 
that most of us are likely to know someone who has had or will have an 
abortion. They are our students and colleagues, our wives, daughters, and 
neighbors. Surely some of them are not the kind of person we think should 
be humiliated by legal process. Indeed, I am never sure which women 
people think should be humiliated by law, but teenagers seem to be high on 
many people’s lists.396 
Here I return to the concept of decisional dignity. If a woman has 
the right to decide whether or not to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, her 
decision should not be taxed with a hidden surcharge of punishment by 
process. Of course we want young women to make informed decisions and 
to be able to talk over a decision as serious as one about whether to become 
a mother with those who care about them and in whom they trust. But 
judicial bypass hearings have little to do with improving the quality of a 
minor’s abortion decision, and much to do with punishing her if she 
proceeds. 
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